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Capitalist economies are societies of production and distribution, in which financial           
systems determine the structure of resource creation. Capital accumulation is the           
structure through which wealth is distributed from this process through time. The paper             
examines the ways in which private financing defines, constructs and destabilizes this            
system. Chapter 1 describes the general process through which finance  
defines the composition of capital in the economy. Chapter 2 describes the recent             
history of financialization, in which the American economy has become increasingly           
subordinated to and destabilized by private finance through a complex web of            
institutional and operational aspects. The paper is a critical analysis of and commentary             






























Economic activity in America is dominated these days by financial contracts . It is 
common for young people between 17 and 18 years old to take on major private debts in 
order to become certified with college degrees. These educations have become more 
necessary and much more expensive, even as they have become much more common, 
and therefore less unique in the labor market. It is a default activity for higher-level 
economic participation.  
 Housing, a critical and extremely expensive asset, is generally purchased either 
temporarily, through the signing of a lease (a rental contract) or the purchase of real 
estate with a large credit line - a mortgage - which will usually initiate a debtor 
relationship of 15 to 30 years, in which large monthly payments are made by the debtor 
back to the creditor, usually a bank. Housing prices have been rising continually for 
decades, even after the interruption of the 2008 financial crisis. Many American’s 
dream of accessing a comfortable financial state if they can sell their own property at an 
inflated price one day. The debtors who must pay the ​present ​real housing price - 
usually more inflated than it has ever been - and must go deeply into debt to do so, are 
convinced that this is a good thing because at some point in the future they ​might 
benefit from the inflation by selling their own asset, thus being able to repay their debt 
to the bank, and collect a personal profit. But the house is gone. They will have to buy a 
new one and start over. To not participate in this market is to be a renter, and sign a 
contract obliging the tenant to a large monthly payment scheme, without ownership of 
the housing asset. Therefore a renter, by not participating in the inflating housing 
market, is worse off than the homeowner.  
Most Americans take on large loans to purchase cars. These expensive vehicles 
are necessary because in most areas there is inadequate access to public transportation, 
and the distances in this country are often very wide.  
Most Americans require expensive insurance contracts for access to a number of 
important services, health insurance (for access to inflated health services) being the 
most prominent scheme. Many Americans routinely enter debt contracts for daily 
commodity consumption with credit cards. If they are unable to service these 
small-scale debts the interest rates can double in a month. Most Americans rely on 
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financial payment contracts for the provision of basic services; trash, electricity, water, 
internet.  
It is common now for people to feel a pressure to be ‘financially literate’ if they 
want to retire above the poverty line or access life's basic necessities. We should 
remember that financial literacy for the masses is a new concept. 
This complex system is hard to understand, to a large degree because false 
narratives concerning government expenditure and the distribution of wealth cajole 
Americans into believing that the services and necessities they indebt themselves to 
access are ‘too expensive’ for the central authority to provide, that it is a moral 
responsibility to repay ones debts to creditors, corporations, and landlords, and that the 
vastly unequal ownership and control of assets is normal and acceptable.  
Financial contracts are designed to lock people into payment plans; they establish 
a coercive economic relationship in which the loan-issuer receives by obligation more 
money over time than it put in. Credit, as a rule in America, is offered in exchange for a 
combination of a ‘principle’ and an ‘interest’ payment, the principle being equal to the 
credit, and the interest being an additional sum paid like a fee for access to the credit 
line; it is the price of money as set by creditors (banks and financers) and also to their 
own benefit.  
A large apparatus of financial markets and institutions has ballooned in the last 
few decades to commodify and exchange within this debt-structure. It is quite common 
for economics students, trained in the analysis of market dynamics, to be  directed into 
private financial institutions for the purpose of perpetuating financial accumulation, 
debt-issuance, securitization, abstract services, ‘money-management’, and stock-market 
maneuvering. Financial actors themselves often discuss the economy and its real 
contracts in a detached way, speaking about debt-securities and capital in terms of 
‘apha’, industry jargon for the active return on an investment as measured 
mathematically. The ‘economy’ is described in media and political discourse in terms of 
equity markets, capitalization figures, and aggregated growth in sales receipts. 
The entire system is therefore financialized, and the financial system and its 




Capitalism is a ‘balance-sheet economy’ of privately ownership and control, 
meaning that all the capital and assets and liabilities can be delineated in dollar 
amounts and that these assets and liabilities are mostly owned and controlled by 
individual people and legal entities. It is also an economy of capital, meaning that it is 
constituted of many tangible materials, machines, buildings, and technologies which 
produce outputs for profit, profit being the difference (-) between revenues (gains) and 
expenditures (costs). And it is an economy of finance, meaning that economic activities 
and objects are actualized, made real, through ‘cash flows’ sent between people and 
entities as either credits, purchases, or liabilities (obligations) as derived from contracts. 
The financial system also encompasses the many money-objects which exist within 
capitalist in order to further the process of production and accumulation; these include 
funds and trusts, stocks and bonds, and securitized debts. It is a system which is 
managed and ‘engineered’ for profit by banks and other financial institutions.  
All factors of production and investment can be expressed in terms of numbers 
and monetary adjacency; every valuable asset is either money or evaluated in relation to 
money, and assets are expected either to access income over time (capital), generate 
income through a sale (investment output) or act as a ​claim on income over time 
(financial contracts). The concept of a default is that a financial asset cannot in actuality 
produce the cash flows which it promises to deliver. When this happens on a large scale, 
and many assets and financial relationships are found to be insolvent, it can trigger a 
collapse of asset values across the financial system, its markets, and then the entire 
economy as the financial apparatus which structures the general economy fails.  
The incentive of capitalism is private profit; in a capitalist society most firms, 
investors, capital-owners and individuals work towards the expansion of their own 
wealth, for private gain. This fundamental desire determines the process of 
accumulation: within the collective function of financing, enterprises, and markets is the 
aggregated drive for ‘more money’ now, and more capital and more assets, for the 
purpose of obtaining more money in the future, which can then be utilized to make 
more money after that point, forever, with a system-wide goal of continual expansion. 
Capitalist systems are intertemporal. Capitalism has a past, a present, and a 
future, in which accumulation either continues successfully - measured in asset-price 
inflation and output levels - or fails, measured in declining output, declining sales, 
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declining incomes, and declining asset values. Over the course of time many contexts 
and realities change, altering the specifics of how capital is accumulated, how profit is 
pursued, and how the system and its component parts react to the social structure of 
production and distribution. But profit is always pursued through an institutionally 
structured process of accumulation.  
Finance links together the past, present, and future of capitalism. Whereas the 
purchase of a commodity or service in a real market occurs in the present moment, 
financial contracts exchange money in the present for money in the future, usually at a 
markup (interest), or otherwise stake ​claims​ on assets or wealth across present and 
future time. By offering credit (present money), private debt-issuers can ensure access 
to a future stream of income in excess of their initial payment.  
Everybody who has been in debt or established a contract to pay over-time 
understands this system intuitively to a certain degree, but it is widely accepted, often 
uncritically. In this paper I present a critical analysis of this system: the system of 
accumulation through private financial operations. By examining the nature of financial 
accumulation through real time - the past and the present - we can see a systemic reality 
in which private finance destabilizes capitalism and harms the general population. The 
financial process of capital accumulation indicates a broader problem with the structure 
through which capitalism produces and reproduces itself through time. That problem is 
an antisocial perpetuation of greed, exploitation, and overexpansion.  
The framework through which to analyze finance in relation to capitalism and its 
real accumulation through time is explained in Chapter 1. It provides an explanation of 
how economic theory can help us understand systems of capital development and 
capital accumulation as structured by finance. Chapter 2 examines the historical and 
institutional process of ‘financialization’, though which private financial systems and 
operations have expanded and occupied an increasingly domineering posture within the 
American economy. This is read as an expansion and acceleration of the dynamics 
explained in Chapter 1.  
The ‘problem’ to be addressed by the theory and analysis is defined by real 
societal issues which are elaborated later on; issues of major importance (and often 
misery) to the American people, which are empirically harmful in a myriad of ways, and 
disturbing and upsetting to the author on a personal level. Whalen explains that this 
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examination - one which consciously examines the dynamic fragility and 
intertemporality of capital - should be the ‘task of economics’ today: 
The task confronting economics today may be characterized as a need to integrate 
Schumpeter's vision of a resilient intertemporal capitalist process with Keynes 
hard insights into the fragility introduced into the capitalist accumulation process 
by some inescapable properties of capitalist financial structures.​1 
 



















1 Whalen (1999), pg. 2 
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Chapter 1: Finance and Capitalism 
The most important dynamic of focus is the intertemporal (over time) process described 
by Minsky (1992), in which resources and capital assets are developed and accumulated 
in capitalist economies. This dynamic is the system of investment financing, an 
exchange of ‘present money’ for ‘future money’.  
By examining this dynamic in relation to capital development and capital 
accumulation, and by distinguishing between these processes as ‘productive vs 
extractive’, we can elaborate a theory through which financial operations construct and 
destabilize the capitalist system.  
In American capitalism, financial relations and structures determine the 
composition of the general economic system​2​. For this reason, analyzing finance is a 
window through which to understand American capitalism. Minsky worked extensively 
to analyze finance and its relationship to capitalism. Here is his characterization of our 
economic system: 
A capitalist economy is characterized by a financial structure which leads to the 
prior commitment of cash flows received, by households, business, governments, 
banks and non-bank financial institutions, to validate their liabilities. 
 
These cash flows are received either from the distribution of the value of output 
among the participants in producing and financing output or from the fulfillment 
of financial contracts​3 
 
These ‘cash flows’ are the payments received within the capitalist economy; they come 
from either the distribution of income as derived from productive activity (wages, 
salaries, profits), or from contractual commitments; this is how debt contracts, 
insurance contracts, and leases generate incomes through obligation, rather than 
productivity. They are legal claims on somebody else's money in a scheduled payment 
process over time; usually a month-to-month basis.  
This concept - of a distinction between over-time payment obligations and the 
productive activity of capital assets to create resources - is the basis of Minsky’s 
2 From Whalen, “Hyman Minsky's Theory of Capitalist Development” (pg 3.) “the in-place financial 
structure is a central determinant of the behavior of a capitalist economy" (Minsky 1993a, 106)” 
3 ​ Minsky (1992), The Capital Development of the Economy and The Structure of Financial Institutions. 
Levy Institute working paper no. 72 (pg. 3)  
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“theoretical argument of the financial instability hypothesis”​4​, which “starts from the 
characterization of the economy as a capitalist economy with expensive capital assets 
and a complex, sophisticated financial system.”​5​ The economic ‘problem’ addressed by 
this theory is “following Keynes… the ‘capital developement of the economy’”​6 
This characterization is relevant because our American economy today is a capitalist 
economy defined by expensive capital assets and sophisticated finance​7​.  
‘Capital developement’ is a process of social resource creation which is 
“accompanied by exchanges of present money for future money. The present money 
pays for resources that go into the production of investment output, whereas the future 
money is the “profits” which will accrue to the capital asset owning firms”.​8  
For this reason, “the focus [of analysis] is on an accumulating capitalist economy 
that moves through real calender time”.​9​ As capital developement is rooted in 
finance-through-time, so is capital accumulation, the system through which output and 
financial markets yield profits to capitalists and financers (more broadly, owners and 
controllers): 
Keynesian economic theory tells us that ​capitalist accumulation​, which involves 
financial and output markets, is a process which ties the past, present and future 
together. It also allows us to identify variables that affect the processes.​10 
 
The process is contextual, and has no inherent stability. In fact because it is fluctuating 
and ‘multidimensional’  it induces an inherent trend towards instability: 
These processes are not constrained by the inherent nature of capitalist 
economies to lead to satisfactory system behavior: there is no guarantee that the 




Financial Instability Hypothesis​, 2 
5 ​ ​Financial Instability Hypothesis​, 2 
6 ​
Financial Instability Hypothesis​, 2 
7 ​In regard to ‘expensive capital assets’ we can consider inflations in equity prices, real estate prices, rents, 
college tuitions, and healthcare. These inflations exist in concurrence with the very expensive ‘baseline’ of 
the American economy; a vast assembly of fixed capital, public infrastructure including an electrical grid, 
a highway network, the Internet, etc. The system is extremely flushed with evaluated wealth, and 
therefore expensive to maintain, operate and expand. The increasing sophistication of finance will be 
explained more in part 2. 
8
 Financial Instability Hypothesis​, 2 
9 ​
Financial Instability Hypothesis​, 2 




In particular we know that the dynamics are best characterized by time 
dependant, nonlinear, and multidimensional relations. This implies that 
hysteresis, chaos or incoherence will characterize the time series that are 
generated, not always but from time to time​11  
 
For the purposes of this paper, I will define this complex system as a general structure of 
making ​and ​taking​ through time. This process is an unstable dynamic between capital 
developement and capital accumulation as structured by finance.  We will also increase 
the critical tone of the analysis based on a large quantity of literature and evidence 
suggesting that the ‘hysteresis, chaos or incoherence’ has been closer to ‘always’ than 
‘from time to time’ over the last 50 years.  
 
1.1 Capital Development 
Capital developments are the resources which accrue to society from the accumulation 
process. Minsky explains his framework: 
Keynes shifts the argument from the Smithian emphasis upon the allocation of 
resources to ​the capital developement of the economy, the creation of resources​.​12 
 
Here is his description of the over-time process through which the developement of 
capital occurs: 
The creation of resources is a process in time. It involves what Keynes called 
enterprise: the forecasting of the prospective yield of assets over their whole life. 
Keynes's dichotomy between enterprise and speculation draws attention to the 
financial structure as an essential element in the capital development process. In 
a successful capitalist economy the financial structure abets enterprise.​13 
 
Enterprise in this sense refers to economic activities which contribute to innovations, 
structural improvements, or income growth within capitalism​14​. The connection 
between developement and finance is that developement must be financed ​before​ it can 
occur. This financing occurs because the financer (the creditor or investor) expects to 
receive an income stream from the debtor in excess of their initial contribution; “the 
11
 The Capital Development of the Economy and The Structure of Financial Institutions, 11-12. My 
emphasis.  
12 ​The Capital Development of the Economy and The Structure of Financial Institutions, 11-12. My 
emphasis.  
13 ​ The Capital Development of the Economy and The Structure of Financial Institutions, 11 
14 ​ Mazzucato and Wray (2016) explain that ““Capital development” is a term defined by Hyman Minsky to 
refer to a broad measure of investment that goes beyond privately owned capital equipment and to 
include  technology, human capital, and public infrastructure.” (pg. 2) 
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process “begins with money to end up with more money”—as both Marx and Keynes 
said”​15​. Recall this description: 
The capital development of a capitalist economy is accompanied by exchanges of 
present money for future money. The present money pays for resources that go 
into the production of investment output, whereas the future money is the 
“profits” which will accrue to the capital asset owning firms​16 
 
This circuit relies on three primary payments, all of which stimulate a flow of economic 
activity: the initial payment (1) from the creditor establishes the debt contract with the 
productive entity (a firm or individual) in exchange for a quantity of money (credit) so 
that capital can be accessed, materials can be purchased, workers can be hired, etc. After 
this point the productive entity engages in economic activity which must yield an 
income; This payment (2) is a quantity of money given from a buyer or obligee to the 
productive entity in exchange for some product or service. Thereafter the productive 
entity - the debtor - can service their financial obligations (payment 3) out of their own 
operational revenues (as derived from payment(s) 2 within the circuit). The creditor can 
use these new incomes as derived from payment(s) 3 to extend new credit lines or 
otherwise invest in the establishment of new contracts expected to yield an excess 
quantity of money in the future.  
This development process can take on many forms and range from socially 
beneficial to socially harmful. It can be equitable or  highly stratified in its creation and 
distribution of resources-produced. A hospital has a much different social impact than a 
weaponry plant established to build missiles; both rely on a financial circuit to be 
created. Furthermore the ownership structure of any particular enterprise as established 
by private investment will involve a certain distribution of incomes-from-output among 
the various members of the firm. The process by which financial structures shape the 
real control of capital assets is a facet of the accumulation process; the ‘taking’ of 
capitalism.  
The focus on ‘development’ as distinct from accumulation is that it involves a 
broader measure of benefit; in between the capitalist accumulation process there might 
be improvements to infrastructure, technology, innovation, and purchasing power for 
15
  Mazzucato and Wray, 8  
16 FIH, 2 
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the majority population. Developement within the capitalist financial cycle is the 
‘making’ of the economy; the functional process which can realize the benefits of 
capitalist production.  
 
1.2 Capital Accumulation 
The accumulation process, involving “financial and output markets, is a process which 
ties the past, present, and future together”​17​.  Accumulation is the accrual and expansion 
of wealth over time as derived either from output​ ​(sales to the real economy) or financial 
contracts (monetary relationships, payment schemes, obligations, and services related 
to these relations).  
The simplified Marxian M-C-M’ circuit represents the accumulation and 
development process in a capitalist system. M is the initial money advanced for the 
production of a commodity (C), which is sold for a price exceeding the initial cost in 
money-quantity (M’). This micro-circuit aligns with Minsky’s description of financed 
capital developement; a process of resource creation which occurs between an initial 
advance of ‘present’ money and a later profit of ‘future’ money.  
The production of commodities which occurs between M and M’, today expanded 
to include ‘resources’ of varying benefit, becomes the Schumpeterian-Keynesian focus in 
contemporary economic theory​18​. The development process as explained by Minsky is 
“accompanied by the exchange of present money for future money”. By nature of 
capitalist profit-seeking, the ‘future money’ must be in excess of the present money for 
the circuit to be successful; in quantitative terms M’ must exceed M.  
The cash flows in the future are legally secured with the initial credit-line of the 
financial entity. The accumulation process is the past-present-future process which 
binds together the money of the past, to the activity of the present,  to the increased 
quantities of money or evaluations of assets in the future. At its core is a drive for more 
wealth. 
17 Capital Developement, 7 
18
 Minsky called the developement-emphasis Keynesian in the Financial Instability Hypothesis (1992) and 
Schumpeterian in The Capital Development of the Economy and The Structure of Financial Institutions 
(1992). The synthesis of these economists, as described by Mazzucato and Wray (2016) is a framework 
accounting for the inherent instability and intertemporal resilience of financed capitalism.  
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Capital Accumulation is the ‘taking’, in which profits accrue to those  controllers 
who possess ownership positions within capitalism. Capital Development is that process 
through which the general society expands its resources, infrastructure, and net wealth - 
the ‘making’ of capitalism. Both are intertwined in that the development of capital is a 
matter of the ​control​ of capital, and both are mediated through and determined by the 
financial system and its contracts: 
As a result of the process by which investment is financed, the control over items 
in the capital stock by producing units is financed by liabilities -- these are 
commitments to pay money at dates specified.​19 
 
We can think of a single factory producing ‘investment output’ to illustrate this reality: 
as the factory comes ‘online’ and begins producing output, the revenues it collects from 
the sale of its products will be distributed amongst those involved in the production 
process ​based on the ownership structure of the firm​: most workers will receive preset 
wages, registered on the balance sheet as ‘costs of production’ and therefore ​minimized 
wherever possible, whereas revenues in excess of production costs are the ‘profits’ which 
accrue to the legal owners of the factory​20​; ​maximizing ​ these gains on behalf of capital 
controllers is the operational goal of capitalist productive units. The owners may own 
the unit (the factory) outright, or may own ‘shares’ in the unit as one among many 
shareholders. The latter scenario is the structure of a legal corporation, in which case 
our factory would usually only be one industrial unit within a larger organizational 
structure​21​.  
More likely than not, the initial monetary sum needed to establish the factory as a 
productive unit was provided to the current owner(s), in the ​past​, by a creditor, for 
example a bank which therefore posses in the ​present​ a claim on regular payments from 
the factory owner for a period of time stretching into the ​future​. The owner of the 
factory, a debtor to the creditor, must service this obligation out of their revenues as 
derived from real sales (successful operations). This is the ‘accumulation’ process in 
action. Profits accrue to capital owners, incomes are paid out to employees as a 
19 Financial Instability Hypothesis, 2 
20 The separation of ownership and control which defines modern corporations makes this system less 
direct and more complex.  
21 Consider that the departments of corporations dedicated to ‘human resources’, marketing, diversity, 
accounting, and logistics (for example) are not actually productive units, but rather institutional 
support-structures of the broader organization.  
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production cost, and financial obligations are paid out to creditors or other financial 
contractors (landlords, insurance brokers). It is the stratified (unequal), legally-enforced 
(obligatory) and socially-structured (institutional) distribution of these incomes which 
defines the accumulation process by which capitalism expands over time. Minsky cites 
Keynes to explain the financial dimension of this system: 
There is a multitude of real assets in the world which constitutes our capital 
wealth - buildings, stocks of commodities, goods in the course of manufacture 
and of transport, and so forth. The nominal owners of these assets, however, have 
not infrequently borrowed money… in order to become possessed of them. To a 
corresponding extent the actual owners of wealth have claims, not on real assets, 
but on money. 
 
A considerable part of the this financing takes place through the banking system, 
which interposes its guarantee between its depositors who lend it money, and its 
borrowing customer whom it loans money wherewith to finance the purchase of 
real assets. The interposition of this veil of money between the real asset and the 
wealth owner is an especially marked characteristic of the modern world.” (p. 
151)​22 
 
This model was described in the 1930s to explain how financial institutions shaped the 
control of capital assets, and utilized financial contracts to establish claims on the 
incomes generated from the output of the capital they helped create. Minsky updates 
this model of financial accumulation for the 1990s: 
The Keynesian vision imposes a structure on spending... A modern capitalist 
economy is structured so that the capital assets of the economy are owned by 
firms that are organized as corporations, firms finance control over these assets 
by liabilities, and directly or through intermediaries households own these 
liabilities…​23 
 
Within this system the financial investment process determines both output levels and 
the distribution of income; a process shaped by the profit-seeking of financers.  
the pace of investment is viewed as calling the tune for both aggregate income 
and its distribution, which is viewed as being determined by the structure of 
demands… In modern capitalist economies, complex corporate organizations 
struggle for market power in order to get an edge in the competition among 
capitals for profits.​24 
 
22 FIH, 3, quoting Keynes (1972) 
23 Minsky, “Uncertainty and the Institutional Structure of Capitalist Economies” (1996), pg. 3 
24 Minsky, “Uncertainty and the Institutional Structure of Capitalist Economies” (1996), pg. 3 
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Therefore the role of financial institutions (the corporation itself being a business firm 
which has been disaggregated into financial assets​25​) is expressed in determining the 
structure of capitalism, both as a societal ownership structure and as a business-activity 
structure. There is also an intertemporal factor; the role of finance in binding together 
capitalist operations across time via financial contracts: 
In a capitalist economy the past, the present, and the future are linked together 
not only by capital assets and labor force characteristics but also by financial 
relations. The key financial relations link the creation and the ownership of 
capital assets to the structure of financial relations​26 
 
At the ​core of the process is the profit-motive​, which defines the operations of capital 
accumulation as well as the underlying psychological engine of the economy. “In spite of 
the great complexity of financial relations, the key determinant of system behavior 
remains the level of profits.”​27 
Therefore there is a continually concurrent process of ‘making’ and ‘taking’ in the 
capitalist economy. The dynamics and contexts of this process change over time. This is 
why Marx focused his political economy on the labor-capital dynamic as the main 
process of ‘making and taking’ in his time.  
The various stages of development in the division of labour are just so many 
different forms of ownership, i.e. the existing stage in the division of labour 
determines also the relations of individuals to one another with reference to the 
material, instrument, and product of labour.​28 
 
Today the relationship between debtor and creditor - and more broadly between the 
financial ​obliger​ and their financial ​obligee​29​ - appears more significant than the 
relationship between labor and capital, although they are both representative of the 
process by which capitalism is developed and expands. Marx discusses it here: 
Nothing is more common than the notion that in history up till now it has only 
been a question of taking... 
 
Taking is further determined by the object taken. A banker's fortune, consisting 
of paper, cannot be taken at all, without the taker's submitting to the conditions 
25
 Stocks, being ‘shares’ of corporations which are sold by the corporation itself to raise cash, are a 
fascinating system through which major businesses now widely operate.  
26 Financial Instability Hypothesis, 4 
27 Financial Instability Hypothesis, 5 
28
Karl Marx, “The German Ideology” (5. The Contradiction Between the Productive Forces and the Form 
of Intercourse as the Basis for Social Revolution) 
29
 The obliger is the one which owes by contract, the obligee is the one which is entitled to what is owed.  
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of production and intercourse of the country taken. Similarly the total industrial 
capital of a modern industrial country. And finally, everywhere there is very soon 
an end to taking, and when there is nothing more to take, you have to set about 
producing.​30 
 
The process of making and taking occurs through financial operations and in-between 
the productive operations of capital assets. Since profit-seeking determines the 
character of innovation and expansion, there is a continual incentive for financers to 
exploit the capital developement process for their own gain within the broader 
accumulation process.  
So long as investment continues to increase, profits increase and encourage 
greater leveraging of prospective income flows. This leads to a self-fulfilling 
prophecy as dependence on external finance increases the size of the circular flow 
such that incomes are even greater than expected, so that margins of safety for 
the next round of spending can be reduced.​31  
 
We can see from the analysis that even a stable and profitable accumulation regime 
engenders instability ​over time​ through the following sequence: as incomes expand (a 
process generated by investment financing), the increase in liquidity and wealth 
entering the payment system allows ‘margins of safety’ to be reduced ‘for the next round 
of spending’. Basically, the success of accumulation as registered in monetary gains 
allows for a concurrent expansion of financial leveraging in the future; in the process the 
accumulation process is destabilized.  
 
1.3 The Liability Structure and Financial Instability 
Financial instability in capitalism emerges from the functional process of developement 
and accumulation. Using the concept of making and taking, financial systems become 
increasing unstable as the ‘taking’ of committed​32​ cash flows exceeds the ‘making’ of real 
production; or incomes from investment output, wages, profits, and financial income 
streams claimed by debtors themselves. Recall that a capitalist economy is 
“characterized by a financial structure which leads to the prior commitment of cash 
30 ​German Ideology, 5. The Contradiction Between the Productive Forces and the Form of Intercourse as 
the Basis for Social Revolution 
31 Mazzucato and Wray, 23 
32 For a cash flow to be ‘committed’ means that it is legally locked in through time; it is a relationship 
which extends via contract into the future.  
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flows”​33​, meaning obligatory payments. These cash flows ‘validate the liabilities’ of 
economic entities; firms, individuals, households, financial institutions.  
The validation of liabilities means that the debts are followed through on. 
Defaults and insolvency are situations within which liabilities ​cannot ​be validated. For 
the debtor this situation is a bankrupcy; a total insolvency. For the creditor this is a 
default of an asset (the liability of the debtor is an asset for the creditor) and a loss on 
investment. A bad situation for everyone; a loss-loss. Therefore it is paramount that the 
cash flows capable of validating liabilities are realized. These cash flows derive from two 
sources:  
the distribution of the value of output among the participants in producing and 
financing output or from the fulfillment of financial contracts​34 
 
Minsky explains that a​ ‘hedge’ ​relationship is one in which the debtor can service both 
their principal and interest obligations from their operational income - their own cash 
flows as derived from the distribution of output-sales​35​ or from financial contracts which 
they hold as a claim on someone else’s income. The contrast to this is a ​‘ponzi’ 
relationship, in which the debtor cannot service their payment obligations except by 
selling assets (surrendering capital) or taking on more debt (increasing the overall 
obligation but delaying bankruptcy further into the future) . This is why Keynes argued 
that “In a successful capitalist economy the financial structure abets enterprise. When 
finance fosters speculation the performance of a capitalist economy falters.”​36 
Therefore, instability increases within the capitalist system as the liability 
structure is composed of a growing number of ‘ponzi units’, or unpayable debts. 
Speculation engenders ponzi finance in that speculative finance is unconcerned with the 
welfare or stability of the debtor; instead it is based on short-term gains. As an 
individual financial relationship the ponzi unit is an extractive dynamic between a 
debtor and creditor: the creditor is demanding of the debtor a sum which cannot be 
paid. On a macro level, a financial structure which demands more payments than the 
33 The Capital Development of the Economy and The Structure of Financial Institutions, 3 
34 ​ The Capital Development of the Economy and The Structure of Financial Institutions, 3 
35
 This still applies to normal people. In the case of a single worker, the “cash flows as derived from the 
distribution of output-sales” are the wages allocated to labor as a share of productive income.  




productive sphere or households can generate can only grow through a debt-bubble: the 
issuance of new debts to continually prevent a debt-deflation of formerly issued 
obligations.  
The liability structures of capitalist societies form the intertemporal system of 
accumulation; they “link yesterdays and tomorrows to today”​37​.  
The overall robustness or fragility of an economies financial structure is 
determined by the mix of hedge, speculative and Ponzi financing units… a 
liability structure in which units are heavily in debt… will be towards the fragility 
end of the spectrum. The financial instability hypothesis… holds that ​over a run 
of good times the financial structure evolves from being robust to being fragile. 
This hypothesis rests upon the profitability of debt financing​.​38 
 
Financial structures shape the capital control of the economy as a factor of financier 
profit-seeking. Since speculative behaviors are rooted in a profiteering desire to realize 
gains at an accelerated and expanded rate, there is a fundamental connection between 
unhealthy financial operations - involving gambling, greed, and instability - and 
concurring malformations in the capital structure of the real economy.  
Speculation in finance translates directly into extraction from the real economy, 
since the financial contracts of the financial system become the liability structure of the 
economy while simultaneously shaping the control and ownership of capital through 
investment financing. The capital structure established by investment financing is the 
same productive system which must validate the liability structure. 
The ​incentive of speculation​ through debt-financing leads to financial 
relationships and credit-transfers which engender extraction rather than stable 
production. As Minsky put it, “Ponzi financing decreases equity for debt increases 
without any increase in assets”​39​. A special advisor to the Norwegian Central Bank 
recently cited Minsky to explain the fundamental instability of privately-financed 
capitalism, as is currently an emergency situation in America and much of Europe: 
Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis (FIH) is an attempt to build a theory 
that is more relevant to our financially sophisticated capitalist economy and to 
show why such an economy is unstable (Minsky 1982, p. 69). Such a theory is 
required if we are to understand the recurrent financial crises affecting our 
economies. Instability should be part of the theory (an endogenous phenomenon) 
37 ​The Capital Development of the Economy and The Structure of Financial Institutions​, 3 
38 Ibid, 5-6 
39 Ibid, 6 
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and not simply the result of some arbitrary external shocks. Our economy is not 
unstable because it is shocked by oil, wars, or monetary surprises, but because of 
its nature."​40 
 
1.4 The Role of Money and Banks 
 
When we examine the financial accumulation system of capitalism, we are referring to a 
system in which money is the primary tool of operations, and the object of desire​41​.  It is 
not ​a byproduct of ‘real’ production or commodity exchange, but rather the specified 
beginning and end of capitalist activity.  
Money is the stimulant which actualizes the developement process and the object 
to be collected and accrued as profits. Therefore it corresponds to our description of 
‘making and taking’; it is the tool of making and the object to be taken.  
 Even capital and other assets which are not money in themselves are evaluated 
in terms of a relation to money; a stock is worthless if it cannot be liquidated and sold at 
its market value, for a ‘higher’ form of cash. We can turn here to the ‘hierarchy’ of 
money, which describes the pyramid-structure through which different money-things 
operate as more or less functional within American Capitalism: 
in the United States the money of account is the dollar, the measure of nominal 
value designated by the state. Many important economic values are denominated 
in dollars: taxes, prices (including wages, fees, and fines), and court-ordered 
restitutions.  
 
the term “dollar” is also used to describe the paper notes issued by the Federal 
Reserve Bank (and coins issued by the Treasury). Most economists would also 
include bank deposits in their definition of money—certainly demand deposits 
and perhaps time deposits—against which checks can be written that can be used 
in payment. 
 
 However, another approach is to use the term money to signify the unit of 
account, and to designate as “money things” the IOUs (debts or liabilities) 
denominated in the money of account. Some money things can be used as media 
40
 Thorvald Grung Moe (2012), “Shadow Banking and the Limits of Central Bank Liquidity Support: How 
to Achieve a Better Balance between Global and Official Liquidity” Levy Working Paper No. 712  
41 Wray, “Money” (pg. 4) “​The claim that a capitalist economy is a “monetary production economy” is… 
adopted by Marx and Veblen and their followers (Dillard 1980). The purpose of production is to 
accumulate money—not to barter the produced commodities for other commodities. As Heilbroner (1985) 
argues, this provides a “logic” to production that makes it possible to do economic analysis. Analysis from 
Marx’s departments, to the circuit approach, to Godley’s (1996) sectoral balances and stock-flow 




of exchange for purchases and means of payment to retire debt; all can be used as 
stores of value (albeit some are more risky than others).  
 
We can think of a hierarchy of money things, with the government’s own IOUs 
(central bank notes and treasury coins, but also central bank reserves—taken 
together these are called high-powered money or the monetary base) at the top​42​.  
 
The ‘government’s own IOU’s’, at the top of the hierarchy, are high-powered monies, 
issued by the central authority, and therefore the ultimate form of money in American 
capitalism; all other money-things exist in relation to the government’s IOUs - in terms 
of their ability to be converted into Federal Reserve Notes (cash) or Reserves. This 
monetary base is issued as the debts of the central authority. 
Just below that would be the deposit liabilities of banks and other financial 
institutions with direct access (or indirect access through correspondent banks) 
to the central bank.​43 
 
We can see that ​chartered banks​ occupy a unique position of power within the money 
hierarchy. Their deposits (numeric quantities of cash registered as liabilities to 
depositors) which they establish through private operations are considered just below 
the notes of the central authority in terms of monetary legitimacy.  
Other (nondeposit) short-term liabilities of financial institutions would be below 
that, then would come the short-term liabilities of nonfinancial corporations. 
Finally, at the bottom would be the short-term liabilities of households and small 
businesses. Taking this approach, one would be following Hyman Minsky (see 
Minsky 2008), who always said that anyone can create money (things), the 
problem lies in getting them accepted.​44 
 
The primary power of banks then is their ability to operate with a unique position of 
privilege and power within the monetary regime. This is surely a great power: Tchernvea 
explains that  
Money not only predates markets and real exchange as understood in 
mainstream economics but also emerges as a social mechanism of distribution, 
usually by some authority of power (be it an ancient religious authority, a king, a 
colonial power, a modern nation state, or a monetary union). Money, it can be 
said, is a “creature of the state” that has played a key role in the transfer of real 
resources between parties and the distribution of economic surplus.​45 
42 Money in Finance, 2 
43 Money in Finance, 2 
44 Money in Finance, 2 
45 Tcherneva (2016), “Money, Power, and Monetary Regimes” Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper 




We can connect this power to transfer resources and distribute surplus to the 
developement/accumulation process inherent to capitalism: 
 
in an “exchange” economy, resources can be redirected to the innovating 
entrepreneur only through provision of new purchasing power, that is, provision 




economic development… [occurs] through creation of new purchasing power that 
would give innovators command over previously utilized resources…  ​economic 
development requires creation of new purchasing power, which can only come 
from credit creation​. Credit allows “detaching productive means (already 
employed somewhere) from the circular flow and allotting them to new 
combinations ​47 
 
In American capitalism this authority to create new purchasing power via credit - 
anchored in the power of the state and universalized by the balance-sheet nature of 
capital - has been ‘privatized’. The responsibility of expanding the money supply within 
the private economy (therefore establishing new purchasing power for the creation of 
resources) is  given to private banks. 
The majority of the liabilities in the current monetary system are the result of 
banks’ multiplication of the money base created by public authorities, through 
the grant of bank credit matched by creation of deposit liabilities or deposit 
transfers credited to enterprises and households. ​48 
 
Chartered banks have a special access to ‘deposit insurance’ as provided by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation and the National Credit Union Administration. These 
agencies of the American central authority insure the deposits of chartered banks and 
financial institutions, providing a fundamental liquidity guarantee to the primary 
liabilities of banks.  
Money therefore exists in a dual role: as a public tool of social power, and a 
privately-manipulated object of capitalist desire. Recall that profit-seeking and the 
46 Mazzucato and Wray, 16 emphasis mine 
47 Mazzucato and Wray, 16 emphasis mine 
48 Kregel and Savona (2020), "The Impact of Technological Innovations on Money and Financial Markets" 
Levy Economics Institute, Public Policy Brief No. 150 
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profitability of debt determines the behavior of financial institutions. This ‘profitability’ 
of debt, coexisting with the public-purpose of bank credit as a development tool, creates 
a contradiction.  
We can observe that the developement and accumulation process is a matter of 
private institutions utilizing a government-issued public resource for their own gain. 
When we consider that the most liquid (convertible) and stable forms of money are the 
‘M1-type money’ which are ​created ​by the government and ​issued​ by banks, we can see 
that the financial accumulation process as well as the socioeconomic developement 
process is anchored to and mediated through a coherent social system of purchasing 
power. 
This gives banks a unique position within the capitalist payment system, the 
liability structure, and the private financial markets which anchor new operations and 
assets to the debt structure. Kregel cites Minsky to explain this positioning of banks and 
the privilege they maintain within capitalism: 
Minsky (1995) notes that even today, despite financial innovation in the 
mechanisms providing clearing of credits and debts, “[a]s the twenty-first century 
approaches, the only reason why banks are special is that they operate the 
‘ultimate’ payment system within economies (the proximate payment mechanism 
is now often a credit card). There are now alternatives to banks for all but the 
provision of the ultimate payment mechanism function. Because banks operate 
the ultimate payments mechanism, those liabilities of banks which serve as the 
‘medium of exchange’ also serve as the standard in which domestic public and 
private debts are denominated.”​49  
 
Because they are protected by the United States government, American banks and 
financial institutions can maintain a continual state of equity; the legally mandated level 
of equity, as targeted by the Federal Reserve. Since the whole thing is now classified by 
what is often called Modern Monetary Theory, it has a feeling of being pre-ordained. In 
the sense that the structural process is centrally, legally administered, it cannot be called 
a free market , but rather a privatized system of monetary-regime managers with 
market elements.
 
Government regulates, oversees, and protects financial institutions. Access to the 
central bank as lender of reserves—and, especially, lender of last resort—is 
49 Kregel, “Democratizing Money” pg. 17  
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essential to keeping bank liabilities liquid by ensuring banks can always convert 
them to high powered money on demand...  
 
This is further guaranteed by deposit insurance— government ensures that even 
if a financial institution becomes insolvent, its insured liabilities can be redeemed 
against government liabilities at par.  
 
With such a guarantee, markets cannot possibly “discipline” the activities of 
protected institutions—who can use insured deposits to finance positions in risky 
assets. ​50 
 
Banks are not ‘savings and loans’ institutions any longer, but rather money managers 
who maintain an oligopolies over the ​practices​ of saving and lending.  They accept 
incomes from depositors and offer credit lines for the establishment of debt contracts, as 
well as a range of complex financial services involving the manipulation and handling of 
financial instruments. This monetary process takes place within the electronic 
infrastructure of the banking apparatus; it is not a bank-vault system of cash quantities 
held in materiality but more broadly a system of credits and debits accounted for in a 
digital matrix. Wray explains it: 
Banks do not lend reserves. When a bank accepts a borrowers IOU, it creates a 
demand deposit... a "money thing" - through a keystroke, simultaneously creating 
a bank liability and an asset in the form of a checkable deposit in the name of the 
borrower... banks make loans and then seek reserves - in private markets (the 
Fed funds market in the United States) or at the central bank. In any case, almost 
all central banks in developed countries now operate with an explicit overnight 
interest rate target, supplying reserves on demand to ensure the target is hit with 
a discretionary rate... ​51 
 
This means that the ‘reserves’ needed to legitimize the banking system as a trustworthy 
and responsible redistribution agent are obtained through 1) private exchange markets 
and 2) government subsidy. This continual refinancing mechanism is in the hands of 
private bankers, a structural privilege that other economic organizations cannot access. 
In fact the process has now expanded - in a more insecure form - to nonfinancial firms, 
as businesses enterprises have learned over-time how fruitful the riches of financial 
enterprise can be: 
 large corporations discovered they could issue commercial paper to finance 
operations at interest rates below those charged by banks on loans. To enhance 
50 Money in Finance (my formatting) 
51 Money in Finance, 8-9 
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liquidity of commercial paper, they obtained back-up lines of credit from banks. 
When commercial paper matures, if holders decide they do not want to “roll 
over” into new commercial paper, the issuing firm can use its line of credit to pay 
off the paper. In this manner, the corporation only needs access to bank credit if 
something goes wrong in the commercial paper market. A given quantity of 
M1-type money (issued by banks) can finance a larger amount of economic 
activity because other money things (issued by shadow banks and nonfinancial 
corporations) are used. ​52 
 
Despite this expansion of financial paper-issuance, we can see that banks ​specifically 
are the providers of the ‘M1’ credit anchoring the rest of the financial system and 
business structure into a stabilized accumulation process. Therefore we see the position 
of private, chartered banks in accessing the distribution and creation of new purchasing 
power without risk. In the capitalist system of developement-through-accumulation, the 
pie grows through debt, as mediated by banks: 
if we want a higher national income and gross domestic product through higher 
investment, it must be financed through additional debt​53 
 
This managerial role coexists with an extractive and profit-seeking role; the coexistence 
makes banks contradictory agents and contributes to a continual undermining of their 
purpose. The pattern which is theorized, and which has been observed in increasing 
volume over time, is that banks and financial institutions focus too much on 
accumulation while neglecting developement; or in other words they take more than 
they make. Bezemer and Hudon (2016) provide a framework for conceptualizing this: 
banks monetize debt, and attach it to the economy’s means of production and 
anticipated future income streams. In other words, banks do not produce goods, 
services, and wealth, but claims on goods, services, and wealth — i.e., Soddy’s 
“virtual wealth.” In the process, bank credit bids up the price of such claims and 
privileges because these assets are worth however much banks are willing to lend 
against it.​54 
 
The authors argue that bank credit today, being ‘extended against collateral’, is ‘based 
on the ownership of assets’; therefore the dynamic which establishes the control of 
assets is based today upon a pre-existing control of assets.  
52 Money in Finance, 9 
53 Money in Finance, 9 
54  Dirk Bezemer & Michael Hudson (2016) Finance Is Not the Economy: Reviving the Conceptual 
Distinction, Journal of Economic Issues, 50:3, 745-768, DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2016.1210384,  
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Economic growth does require credit to the real sector, to be sure. But most 
credit today is extended against collateral, and hence is based on the ownership 
of assets. As Schumpeter (1934) emphasized, credit is not a “factor of 
production,” but a precondition for production to take place​55 
 
To analyze banks more functionally we can think of a distinction between economic 
value and economic rent: 
the distinction between value and rent, which is all but lost in contemporary 
analysis. Only then can we understand how the bubble economy’s 
pseudo-prosperity was fueled by credit flows — debt pyramiding — to inflate 
asset markets in the process of transferring ownership rights to whomever was 
willing to take on the largest debt​56​.  
 
A bank “monetizing debt” means that they are turning the financial contract into a 
commodified object of short-term value. This is what happens when a debt contract is 
‘securitized’; sold off. Bezemer and Hudson argue that banks are not producing real 
goods or services, or even wealth, but instead claims on wealth. Minsky described the 
behavior of banker innovation and profit-seeking as critical to the financial instability 
dynamic. The ‘profitability of debt’ is destabilizing to the economy because banks have 
an obvious and continual incentive to operate and innovate in a way which engages the 
profitability of debt to the detriment of their debtors. ​B​anking is a business enterprise 
which generate large revenues and asset-price inflations. We should understand banks 
to be rent-capturing enterprises. Minsky explains this behavior in relation to a financial 
instability model: 
the financial instability hypothesis takes banking seriously as a profit-seeking 
activity. Banks seek profits by financing activity and bankers. Like all 
entrepreneurs in a capitalist economy, bankers are aware that innovation assures 
profits. Thus, bankers (using the term generically for all intermediaries in 
finance), whether they be brokers or dealers, are merchants of debt who strive to 
innovate in the assets they acquire and the liabilities they market.​57 
 
To summarize, the monetary system is a top-down structure of decreasingly liquid 
money-objects, the wellspring of high-powered money being the central authority (the 
US government), and the primary distributive apparatus of this resource-claim system 
being the private banking system as maintained by the ‘central bank’, the Federal 
55 Bezemer and Hudson, 747 
56 Bezemer and Hudson, 749 
57 Financial Instability Hypothesis, 6 
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Reserve. This institutional structure, reproduced to maintain a stable payment system 
and a developement-accumulation financing process, is run by profit-seeking banks 
which strive to innovate and expand in their operations; this involves the issuance of 
debt obligations to the public, the holding of public money-stocks in digitally networked 
deposits, and the servicing and manipulation of financial contracts. The process is 
driven by a continual pursuit of profit, with an emphasis on the maximum extraction of 
future income flows from the population by banks and financial institutions.  
 
1.5 Finance beyond Banking  
Finance can be divided into two wide categories. Firstly and primarily there is the 
‘paper-issuance’ associated with the establishment of financial contracts. This is what 
banks investors do when they extend credit lines as loans, what insurance brokers do 
when they insure, and what landlords do when they offer leases for future-scheduled 
rent payments.  
Secondly and extending out of this system is a vast structure of markets, firms, 
managers and ‘engineers’, the general objective being to accrue profits from the liability 
structure.  
The United States financial structure is a mixture of institutions that originate 
financing and market based institutions that hold paper which they “buy” from 
markets.​58  
 
Banks can create “money” and finance spending, but other financial institutions 
cannot—they can only create substitutes for money, intermediating between 
banks and final users”​59 
 
We can consider the stock market: this is an exchange system in which pieces of 
corporations are traded. Traders hope to profit from the fluctuating evaluations of such 
assets. The ‘paper’ of issuance is the share itself; an asset issued by the corporation to 
raise cash for its operations. Therefore the capacity of the stock-trader to profit from 
market operations rests upon the legitimacy of the corporation in issuing a share of its 
own corpus, objectified in a legal asset. The value of the stock - a symbolic asset - is 
anchored in the real capacity of the firm to generate profits from its operations.  
58 The Capital Development of the Economy and the Structure of Financial Institutions, 22 
59 Money in Finance, 9 
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A mortgage-backed security is a tradable commodity. It’s value is anchored in the 
obligatory cash-flows of the debtor (the home-buyer) to the creditor (the bank). The 
mortgage - which is itself a contract promising continual payment - is packaged and sold 
within a new commodity to financial markets.  
The securitization of standard mortgages was a technique by which Savings and 
Loans and Mortgage companies originated mortgages which were then packaged 
as securities for the portfolios of holders such as pension funds, life insurance 
companies, mutual trusts and various international holders​60 
 
Minsky explains the 'steps and players' of securitization:  
(1) ​A debtor​: the fundamental paper emitter and source of the cash flows from 
income that validate the securities 
(2) ​The paper creator​: the bank loan officer who structures the credit  and accepts 
debtors promises to repay.  
(3)​ The investment banker​... finds and negotiates with the paper creator, buys the 
paper... the paper becomes the corpus of the trust. Investment banker creates 
securities, devising ways to enhance credit (insurance, complex of liabilities, 
ersatz equity in the form of junk bonds). The investment banker hires 
"econometricians" or financial economists to demonstrate that the risks of 
default on interest and principle of some class of the securities it proposes to 
issue are so small that these instruments deserve to have an investment rating 
that implies a low interest rate. 
4) ​The trustee​: holds the basic paper - the corpus of collateral for the securities 
 5) ​The servicing organization​: (often the paper creator, a source of bank fee 
income) receives payments from the corpus and tramsits the funds to the trustee. 
6) ​The rating services​: places the resulting securities into risk classes... if the 
securities fall below some rating or perhaps are threatened to fall below some 
rating the trustee is supposed to act to protect the interests of the security 
holders.​61 
 
We can see that this system relies on the same fundamental structure of financed 
capitalism: the debtor is locked into an obligatory repayment scheme, diverting their 
cash flows from their incomes or other sources of wealth (sale of capital or financial 
relationships) to the servicing of their obligations. The legal enforcement of repayment 
stretching into the future is the process by which securities and financial instruments 
derive their value and can be engineered or traded within the financial sector. Despite 
its complexity, it is rooted foremost in the financial relationship subjecting the obliger to 
a compulsory cash flow, and psychologically by the desire of the financers involved in 
60 The Capital Development of the Economy and the Structure of Financial Institutions, 22 
61  Minsky, “Securitization”, 7-8 (my formatting) 
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the process to realize profits and gains for themselves by ‘taking’ from those obliged to 
give.  
We can think of Minsky’s schematic as the skeleton of the ‘financial 
superstructure’  which has dominated American society for decades. In its real form it is 
much more complex, but it relies on this premise: a liability structure made up of legal 
obligations to deliver payments, fed by ‘paper creators’ - which in private finance are 
often bankers - and beyond this a larger institutional structure​62​ of financial, insurance, 
analytical and servicing organizations which commodify, ‘engineer’, and exchange 
within the system for private gain. 
We can consider to this end that the steps and players extending beyond players 
(1) and (2) of securitization, meaning those entities which operate in terms of the 
commodification of papers rather than the actual debtor-creditor relationship encoded 
in the paper, are almost all functionally useless to society, as they do not contribute to 
the development process but rather generate multiplied degrees of accumulation by 
‘engineering’ financial contracts for sale.  
 The ‘security’, fundamentally, is a financial relationship which has been 
transformed​ into a commodity that can be bought and sold easily in a market. Securities 
elucidate broader developments within financed capitalism, discussed by Minsky in the 
late 1980’s:  
Securitization reflects a change in the weight of market and bank funding 
capabilities: Market funding capabilities have increased relative to the funding 
abilities of banks and depository financial intermediaries​63 
 
For this reason, “securitization implies that there is no limit to bank initiative in creating 
credits”​64​. There is a distinction between the establishment of financial relationships 
(debt contracts, property leases, insurance contracts, capital [corporate] stock) on one 
hand, and the commodified exchange of papers​65​ on the other .  
62
 Examples of this include equities markets, ‘futures’ contracts, repurchase agreements, 
mortgage-backed-securities, hedge funds, pension funds, private equity firms, mergers and acquisitions 
firms, ratings agencies, asset managers, ‘quants’, finance and business lawyers, etc.  
63 Minsky, “Securitization”, 2 
64 Minsky, “Securitization”, 4 
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With financial contracts being the primary ‘anchors’ of the system, and the 
accumulation of wealth or money being the general objective, we can connect the 
developement and accumulation process of capitalism to the superstructure of financial 
markets and financial engineering; the theory being that the operations through which 
capitalism expands provides a continual flow of value-anchors to finance which can be 
packaged and sold, sliced and diced, and otherwise manipulated by traders and 
money-managers for private profits. 
Objects of new value are created based on the promise of somebody else’s new 
cash flows. Bezemer and Hudson examine finance, insurance, and real estate (the ‘FIRE’ 
sector) in America to explain a “classical rent theory” of finance. The FIRE sector is 
contrasted to GDP as a metric of accumulation. This is because GDP represents real 
sales - accumulation through the sale of goods and services - whereas the FIRE sector 
accumulates primarily through its own financial contracts: debt obligations, insurance 
payments, fees and fines, the sale of financial assets, the securitization of financial 
relationships, etc. 
To the extent that the FIRE sector accounts for the increase in GDP, this must be 
paid out of other GDP components. Trade in financial and real estate assets is a 
zero-sum (or even negative-sum) activity, comprised largely of speculation and 
extracting revenue, not producing “real” output.​66 
 
The most important situation is a contemporary dynamic corresponding to Minsky’s 
model of a ‘Ponzi’ liability structure.  
The long-term impact must be to increase debt-to-GDP ratios, and ultimately to 
stifle GDP growth as the financial bubble gives way to debt deflation, austerity, 
unemployment, defaults, and forfeitures. This is the sense in which today’s 
financial sector is subject to classical rent theory, distinguishing real wealth 
creation from mere overhead.​67 
 
The rentier theory is explicitly critical of finance, the perspective being that rather than 
contributing to productivity, private finance extracts value from the economy through 
networks of obligation. To this end it is necessary to critique the structures which 
legitimize the financial system, such as the accounting systems of economic analysis 
commonly used to ‘explain’ what is going in on in American capitalism. Bezemer and 
Hudson argue that the 
66
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“real” economy​ is where goods and services are produced and transacted, 
tangible capital formation occurs, labor is hired, and productivity is boosted. 
Most productive income consists of wages and profits. The rentier network of 
financial and property claims — ​“Economy #2”​ — is where interest and economic 
rent are extracted. Unfortunately, this distinction is blurred in official statistics.  
 
The [National Income and Products Accounts] conflate “rental income” with 
“earnings,” as if all gains are “earned.” Nothing seems to be unearned or 
extractive. The “rent” category of revenue — the focus of two centuries of classical 
political economy — has disappeared into an Orwellian memory hole.  
 
National accounts have been recast since the 1980s to present the financial and 
real estate sectors as “productive” (Christophers 2011). Conversely, much of the 
notional household income in national accounts does not exist in cash flow terms 
(net of interest and taxes)... That is what makes the seemingly empirical 
accounting format used in most economic analysis an expression of 
creditor-oriented pro-rentier ideology.​68 
 
This extends to a general critique of the financial sector, at least in the contemporary 
economy but more broadly as a result of the financial process of capital accumulation: 
The financial sector does not produce goods or even “real” wealth. And to the 
extent that it produces services, much of this serves to redirect revenues to 
rentiers, not to generate wages and profits. 
 
banks monetize debt, and attach it to the economy’s means of production and 
anticipated future income streams. In other words, banks do not produce goods, 
services, and wealth, but claims on goods, services, and wealth… In the process, 
bank credit bids up the price of such claims and privileges because these assets 
are worth however much banks are willing to lend against it. ​To the extent that 
the FIRE sector accounts for the increase in GDP, this must be paid out of other 
GDP components​69  
 
We can see an example of this process in the securitization of mortgages. Mortgages are 
very large debt contracts which are usually established with bank credit lines, for the 
purpose of purchasing a permanent access (a deed) to housing. They typically consign 
the debtor household to a 15-30 year repayment scheme averaging “$1,275 [per month] 
on 30-year fixed mortgage, and $1,751 [per month] on a 15-year fixed mortgage”​70​, not 
68 Bezemer and Hudson, 749 
69 Bezemer and Hudson, 749-750 
70
 Liz Knueven (2020), "The average monthly mortgage payment by state, city, and year". Business 
Insider, 'Personal Finance' section: "The median monthly cost of homeownership in the US is $1,556 per 
month, according to the most recent data from the Census Bureau's 2018 American Community Survey. 
That cost includes not only the monthly mortgage payment, but also other necessary costs like insurance, 
HOA fees, and property taxes.” 
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to mention insurance contracts, homeowners-association fees, and property taxes. 
These mortgages, once established as legal contracts, in turn act as value-anchors which 
financial institutions can use to establish new financial instruments and assets: 
each mortgage—serviced out of income flows of the homeowner—might serve as 
collateral behind all sorts of securities, and securities of securities, and securities 
cubed, and all manner of other derivatives that were essentially bets on default. If 
we look at aggregate numbers, each dollar of US income was devoted to servicing 
five dollars of debts and securities, and unknown dollar amounts of derivatives. 
Worse, the terms of the debts were—literally—impossible for homeowners to 
meet. The whole superstructure of finance began to collapse in late 2007.​71 
 
The concept of a financial-contract sector which extracts wealth from the economy, 
rather than contributing new value, allows us to analyze finance as harmful rather than 
productive to the economy. We can model this harm in multiple ways: there is evidence 
indicating economic stagnations and downgrades over time in the American economy. 
There is also a process within American finance which appears to be biased towards 
short-termism, rising indebtedness, asset-price inflations and continual expansionism. 
This is financialization; the process is explained in Chapter 2. 
The concept of ‘shadow banking’ broadly illustrates the growing institutional 
sophistication of finance-beyond-banking which has been occurring over time, 
reshaping the accumulation system as defined by private finance.  
Shadow banking is defined as “credit extension outside of the banking system” 
(FSB 2011b). It includes entities such as hedge funds, money market funds, 
pension funds, insurance companies, and to some extent the large custodians 
such as Bank of New York and State Street Bank. Shadow banks typically fund 
themselves with securities lending transactions, i.e., ​use (and reuse) of the 
collateral they post with banks​. Investment banks may conduct much of their 
business in the shadow banking system, but they are not shadow banks 
themselves. The shadow banking system makes up 25 to 30 percent of the total 
financial system (FSB 2011b) and was a major contributor to the GFC.​72 
 
 Over the past half century, other “nonbank” or “shadow bank” financial 
institutions have developed a wide variety of substitutes for bank demand 
deposits, some of which allow holders to write checks for payment. Increasingly, 
credit cards and debit cards are used in payments. All of these developments 
appear to make it difficult to define money with precision.​73 
 
71 Money in Finance, 11 
72 Moe, 36 
73 Money in Finance, 2 
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To conclude, the private financial sector as it extends beyond the ‘basics’ of banking is 
vast and overcomplicated. The most important dynamic exhibited throughout the 
system is the commodification of financial relationships for private markets, and more 
broadly a socioeconomic process through which finance ‘takes’ far more than it ‘makes’ 
within the capitalist process of developement and accumulation. The multifaceted 
composition of finance, rather than contributing to healthy system diversification, can 
be read as a series of maladaptive overgrowths encouraging a deviancy of financial 
operations away from productive contributions to the general society.  
 
Summary of Chapter  1 
We can conclude that there is a financial process through which capitalist economies 
develop and accumulate capital through time, with financial contracts being the primary 
‘tools’ of the system, their main purpose being to inject credit into the economy as 
investment financing or otherwise provide some financial service, in exchange for an 
obligatory payment-plan which is scheduled into the future.  
This economic system is a ‘monetary production’ regime in which a 
centrally-administrated resource (money) is distributed and accumulated through 
banking networks, for private gain. The functional process establishes a large pool of 
assets and wealth through which new financial instruments can be packaged and 
engineered, to be sold in financial markets or held in portfolios, with the general 
objective at any given point being the continually-expanding accumulation of wealth 
and capital for those who retain ownerships - positions of power and control - within the 
capitalist system.  
We can also note that the process by which this system is destabilized, namely the 
‘financial instability hypothesis’ as described by Minsky, is a theoretical model which 
explains the structure in which this dynamic will produce its own undermining 
conditions and ruin the process of orderly accumulation through time. The continually 
extractive elements of finance create conditions of untenable liability structures, 
through which the general economic system of capitalism - as mediated through a 
financial circuit process - is destabilized.  
In the following chapter we will examine the recent history, of the past 50 years, 
in which this general system has become amplified and increasingly dysfunctional; the 
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process of ‘financialization’ which has overtaken the American economy. This analysis is 
conducted through a review of the literature and empirical evidence related to these 



































Chapter 2: ‘Financialized’ Capital Accumulation 
 
The way to make money is to buy when blood is running in the streets.  




In order for the American economy - which is highly capitalistic - to grow and develop 
over time, there must be a set of institutions and structures which form an orderly 
system of administration, an ‘accumulation regime’. Stockhammer (2008) describes an 
accumulation regime as a “macroeconomic dynamic... embedded in a particular 
institutional setting (the “mode of regulation”)”​74​.  
The arguments of this chapter are that a process of ‘financialization’ has 
generated a highly complex and multi-variant shift within American capitalism since the 
1970’s, continuing into the present day. Despite the complexity of this transition, the 
fundamental dynamic is as an increasing penetration and domination of financial 
operations within and over the accumulation process of American capitalism. 
We have established the structure through which private finance determines and 
drives the process of capitalism - primarily  through hierarchical investment circuits and 
more broadly through a financial system which seeks to profit from this structure in a 
myriad of ways. With this structure in mind we will analyze contemporary capitalism 
through the following sequence of examination: 
Section 2.1​ describes the evolution of capitalism into a ‘new mode’ of 
accumulation, identified by Minsky (for example) as ‘Money Manager Capitalism’. This 
overtime transition is the process of financialization. 
Section 2.2​ describes the capital accumulation paradigm which has been 
established as a result of financialization; the argument is that the old form of 
capitalism, as defined by investments in tangible productivity and growth through firm 
profits and wages, has been replaced by a ‘bubble economy’, in which the primary 
growth model involves utilizing financial circuits to inflate the price of capital and 
financial assets.  
Section 2.3​ provides some description of the real operations which occur within 
this accumulation system, primarily the contemporary systems employed by the 
financial sector to actualize the ‘bubble economy’.  
Section 2.4​ describes how this accumulation regime is maintained by and 
embedded within an institutional structure, involving the central authorities, the legal 
system, and the social structure, the argument being that capitalism in its current, 
74 Stockhammer, 185 
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financialized form is not a ‘free market’ but rather a highly organized and administrated 
(i.e. ‘planned’) appereratus.  
These sections cohere to provide a general description of contemporary American 
capitalism as defined by financialization and a debt-bubble expansionism. Since the 
primary and recurring factor throughout each pillar is the expanded penetration of 
private financial operations and systems into the social structure,  the argument is that 
the general process of financed-accumulation as explained in Chapter 1 is the 
explanatory aspect of this system.  
 
2.1 Financialization 
Minsky in the 1990’s identified and described a new period in the long-term 
development of capitalism, which he called Money-Manager Capitalism.​75​ The concept 
of ‘money management’ refers to investment entities and actors who, rather than 
providing credit for the establishment of tangible financial relationships, instead utilize 
existing financial relationships as ‘legalized’ in contracts (and made tangible in ‘pools’ of 
financial assets and instruments) to generate profits within the financial sector. Whalen 
(1999) explains it as such: 
The rise of institutional investors encouraged continued financial-system 
evolution by providing a ready pool of buyers for securitized loans, the 
commercial paper of finance companies, and other innovations.  
 
It also fueled the trend toward mergers, acquisitions, corporate breakups, 
leveraged buyouts and stock buybacks--since fund managers have a strong 
incentive to support whatever initiatives promise to boost near-term portfolio 
value. These managed-money funds often provided the resources that raiders 
needed to secure corporate control​76 
 
Recall the explanation in ​section 1.5​ of how the financial sector, expanding ‘beyond 
banking’, can utilize financial ‘papers’ such as bank loans and corporate bonds to 
engineer new assets. We can recognize that institutional investors, working within 
75
 Whalen, 5 (citing Minsky) (my emphasis): “[Money-Manager Capitalism] Became a reality in the 1980s 
as institutional investors... the largest repositories of savings in the country, began to exert their influence 
on financial markets and business enterprises... business leaders became increasingly sensitive to 
short-term profits and the stock-market valuation of their firm... By the 1980s, ​money managers were the 
masters​.” 
76
 Whalen, 6 
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profit-seeking firms and with large volumes of financial objects at their disposal, have 
exerted an increasing influence over the economic system over time. There are many 
trends associated with this evolution: ‘mergers and acquisitions’, ‘leveraged buyouts’, 
and ‘corporate breakups’ for example, involve the utilization of funds to ‘raid’ or 
otherwise restructure business firms, even sell them off for piecemeal gain. ‘Stock 
buybacks’ are a process through which corporations spend cash to ‘repurchase’ shares of 
their own firms.  
The general motivation within any of these systems are ​short term gains​ for 
financial actors, who can profit from sales of financial assets, or see their portfolios 
increase in value from holding financial instruments which are ‘well managed’ - 
meaning operationalized in the ways described above (and more!). As the financial 
system has expanded and grown, the ‘pools’ of instruments and assets which enable 
these operations have grown as well. Stockhammer describes the complexity of this 
evolution: 
While there is a universal agreement that the Fordist accumulation regime has 
come to an end in the course of the 1970s, there is no agreement on how to 
characterize the post-Fordist regime (or if a such is already in place). After an 
initial emphasis on flexibility and, later information and communication 
technology as driving forces of the accumulation regime, financial factors have 
recently received more attention. 
 
 The notion of a “finance-dominated” accumulation regime is proposed to 
highlight that financial developments crucially shape the pattern and the pace of 
accumulation.​77 
 
The Fordist regime, associated with mass-industrialization, was stabilized by the 
structure of what Minsky called ‘managerial capitalism’, in regulatory interventions and 
social services constrained the excesses of capital accumulation. For the purposes of this 
paper we can examine financialization as a period shift and institutional realignment of 
finance within American capitalism. It culminated in the 2008 financial crisis (which 
became the Global Financial Crisis) in terms of the most extreme period of financial 
instability. The liability structure failed (a debt-deflation), and its failure was rooted in 
the new accumulation structure of the United States.  
77 Stockhammer, 185 
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Keeping in mind the dual role of developement and accumulation within financed 
capital circuits (the exchange of present-for-future money), we can examine the 
increasing role of finance as an ​accumulating​ system, rather than a ​developmental 
system. We can also examine the expanding ways in which finance has contributed to a 
general destabilization of society through the same dynamic elaborated in part 1; that 
dynamic being the use of credit to (1) establish the control over real capital in the 
economy and (2) establish claims on future income streams. 
Financialization is an economic process approached from many angles. Wide 
scholarly interest in the phenomenon is explained by Zwan: 
Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, scholars from a variety of disciplines… have 
used the concept of financialization to describe [the] shift from industrial to 
finance capitalism… what unites these studies is a view of finance beyond its 
traditional role as provider of capital for the productive economy.​78 
 
Stockhammer explains: 
The notion of financialization covers a wide range of phenomena:  
- the deregulation of the financial sector and the proliferation of new 
financial instruments  
- the liberalization of international capital flows and increasing instability 
on exchange rate markets 
- a shift to market-based financial systems  
- the emergence of institutional investors as major players in financial 
markets  
- the boom (and bust) asset markets, shareholder value orientation and 
changes in corporate governance (of non-financial business) 
- increased access to credit by previously ‘underbanked’ groups or changes 
in the level of (real) interest rates.  
- Financialization has also been used to highlight psychological changes and 
ideological structures.​79 
 
This is a very complicated process - it is highly sophisticated and multivariate. So we can 
analyze it from a simplified framework which reflects the general trend in each 
disaggregated system of financialization: that is the increasing penetration of private 
financial operations and accumulative behavior into the social system.  
Therefore in any given economic issue related to financialization - interest rates, 
indebtedness, institutions and organizations, shareholder value, access to credit, etc. - 
there is always the trend of an expansion of financial operations; the private 
78 Zwan, 99 
79 Stockhammer, 184 (my formatting) 
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establishment of financial-obligation contracts and the trading / manipulation of these 
contracts by financial institution, for private and sectorally internalized gain.  
The argument is that the financial system has evolved over time, becoming 
increasingly complex and internally-innovative. Investors have become 
‘institutionalized’, operating increasingly within financial channels rather than in 
relation to productive enterprise. This paradigm has been fueled by ‘funds’ of managed 
assets which are pooled together and accumulated from debt-securities, commercial 
papers, and newly-engineered financial instruments. The vast quantity of financial 
assets at the disposal of funds and money-managers (continually fed by newly-issued 
financial contracts) enable practices like ‘corporate raiding’, mass-market trading, 
‘shareholder-value orientations’, and ‘stock buybacks’, the continual trend being the 
accrual of profits and short-term gains from financial operations, often at the expense of 
productive or tangible enterprise. This has negative consequences for the ‘real’ economy 
and the general population of workers: 
Money manager pressures... encouraged corporate downsizing and 
re-engineering... in addition to job insecurity, employees...faced a workplace in 
which productivity pressures and contingent work was on the rise while many 
intra-organizational job ladders and employer-provided training opportunities 
were being eliminated​80 
 
We can observe that between the 1980’s and now the American economy has become 
ultra-financialized. The literature surrounding financialization appears to agree that 
America capitalism has become increasingly subordinated to financial operations and 
institutions in its ‘pattern and pace of accumulation’.  
Consider that this pattern and pace of accumulation is in fact the financially 
structured system through which social resources are produced, and through which the 
control and real ownership of capital is determined, as discussed in Chapter 1. Therefore 
the financialization paradigm is not only a commentary on finance but more broadly on 
the ​role​ of finance in establishing a ​new​ capitalism: 
Capitalism in the United States is now in a new stage, money manager capitalism, 
in which the proximate owners of a vast proportion of financial instruments are 
mutual and pension funds.  
 
80
 Whalen, 6 
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The ​total return on the portfolio is the only criteria​ used for judging the 
performance of the managers of these funds, which translates into an emphasis 
upon the bottom line in the management of business organizations.  
 
It makes the long view a luxury that only companies which are essentially owned 
by a single individual and which are not deeply dependent upon external 
financing can afford.​81 
 
The analytical commentary on financialization is quite negative. We can see that it has 
involved benefits to the private financial sector at the expense of most people, even 
many business structures within American capitalism.  
82
 
From this graph we can see that the financial industry’s share of profits has been 
outpacing its ‘value added’ contribution to the general accumulation process since the 
late 1980’s. In this empirical sense finance is ‘taking’ more than it is ‘making’. 
81
 Minsky (1996), “Uncertainty and the Institutional Structure of Capitalist Economies”, pg. 1  
82
 Mazzucato and Wray, pg. 3. The authors explain the graph: “ the financial system evolved over the 
post-war period from one in which closely regulated and chartered commercial banks were dominant, to 
one in which financial markets dominated the system. Over this period, the financial system grew rapidly 
relative to the nonfinancial sector, rising from about 10% of value added and a 10% share of corporate 
profits to 20% of value added and 40% of corporate profits in the US (see below). This was, to a large 
degree, because instead of finance financing the capital development of the economy, it was financing 
itself” (pg. 2) 
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Lapavistas and Mendiata-Munoz (2016) discuss the history of these expansionary 
profits which the financial sector have reaped, beginning even before the period of 
financialization:  
From the end of the Second World War to the early 1960s... financial profits 
began to rise as a proportion of total profits... 
 
from the early 1960s to the early 1980s... financial profits made up a fairly stable 
part of total profits. That period was marked by the gradual abolition of controls 
over interest rates, a rise in inflation and, crucially, a profound crisis of capitalist 
accumulation in the 1970s, which ushered in financialization.​83 
 
Many analysts express this observation; that a ‘crisis of capitalist accumulation’ 
stimulated the transition of the economy into a state of financialization.  The general 
concept, as expressed by Lazonick (2010) is that a failure of the American ‘business 
model’ to remain competitive and profitable in the face of global competition and 
internal stagnations led to an abandonment of industrial reinvestment as a growth 
paradigm.  A shift towards short-termism via financial operations was the sensible 
reorientation, even if it engendered increasing instability. 
From the early 1980s to the early 2000s, the period of aggressive financialization, 
financial profits exploded as a proportion of total profits. The sharp rise of 
financial profits during these two decades was marked by pronounced cycles, and 
came to an end with the profound crisis of 2007–09. Indeed, the bubble that 
preceded the crisis can be seen as a frantic attempt to boost financial profits 
following the peak of 2003.​84 
 
This brief history displays a transition in which the financial sector, gradually ‘warming 
up’ through the accumulation of stable profits, expanded its social posture, increasing 
its economic power at an accelerating pace in response to economic stagnations in other 
sectors and systems. Although it was a degradation of the accumulation regime which 
enabled the ‘period of aggressive financialization’ beginning in the 1980’s, we can 
observe that the origins of the process began in the ‘run of good times’ between the end 
of World War 2 and the 1960’s, in the sense that financial profits began to expand in 
relation to total profits.  
The financial sector was expanding its economic gains at the expense of others 
sectors in terms of productivity. An increase in gross corporate debt over the post-1970’s 
83  Lapavitsas and Mendieta-Munoz, 5 
84  Lapavitsas and Mendieta-Munoz, 5 
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period has been cited as a definitive characteristic of the financialization of 
non-financial corporations, and flow of funds data clearly document rising corporate 
leverage.​85 
 
Debt relative to Capital Stock, 1950-2014 
86
 
This figure illustrates the long trend of corporate debt (obligations) increasing relative 
to (productive) capital stock, a process which has been ongoing since the 1950’s but 





Capital Assets and Financial Assets relative to Median Yearly Sales, 1950-2014 
85 Davis, 126 





This figure provides a visualization of the detachment of capital stock from financial 
assets within the balance sheets of American firms, indicating a growing divorce 
between financial instruments and the productive capital. Capital stock, being the 
tangible assets which contribute materially to the production process, can be a proxy for 
‘real’ production, in contrast to financial assets, which are objects representing financial 
obligations, claims on assets, and money-things.  
Stockhammer explains that this expansion of financial operations and systems 
has ironically not contributed to investment. In fact there has been a declining trend in 
firm investments as a proportion of operating surpluses since the 1970’s​88​. Lazonick 
describes the growing practice of ‘stock buybacks’ as being largely responsible for this 
trend; companies have increasingly spent their retained earnings from operations on 
repurchases of their own financial assets, rather than investments in tangible capital. He 
describes how “in the years prior to the financial crisis” many major corporations and 
87 Davis, 199 
88 Stockhammer, 190 
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financial institutions spent hundreds of billions of dollars on the repurchase of their 
own stocks​89​, often in excess of their operating income.  
Meanwhile the general US profit rate has been either declining or stagnating 
since a peak in the 1960s, in a time period corresponding to the increase in private 
financial profits and operations. For a capitalist economy, this is not good; the ‘profit 
rate’ stagnating over time indicates a fundamental failure in the accumulation process, 





89  Lazonick, 697 - 698: “​Among the biggest stock repurchasers in the years prior to the financial crisis 
were many of the banks that were responsible for the meltdown and were bailed out under the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP). They included Citigroup ($41.8 billion repurchased in 2000– 07), Goldman 
Sachs ($30.1 billion), Wells Fargo ($23.2 billion), JP Morgan Chase ($21.2 billion), Merrill Lynch ($21.0 
billion), Morgan Stanley ($19.1 billion), American Express ($17.6 billion), and U.S. Bancorp ($12.3 
billion). In the eight years before it went bankrupt in 2008, Lehman Brothers repurchased $16.8 billion, 
including $5.3 billion in 2006–07. Washington Mutual, which also went bankrupt in 2008, expended 
$13.3 billion on buybacks in 2000–07, including $6.5 billion in 2006–07. Wachovia, ranked thirty-eighth 
among the Fortune 500 in 2007, did $15.7 billion in buybacks in 2000–07, including $5.7 billion in 
2006–07, before its fire sale to Wells Fargo at the end of 2008. Other major financial services companies 
that did substantial repurchases beginning in 2000, before they ran into financial distress in 2008, were 
AIG ($10.2 billion), Fannie Mae ($8.4 billion), Bear Stearns ($7.2 billion), and Freddie Mac ($4.7 billion). 
By spending money on buybacks during boom years, these financial corporations reduced their ability to 
withstand the crash of the derivatives market in 2008, thus exacerbating the jeopardy they created for the 
economy as a whole.” 
90  Lapavitsas and Mendieta-Munoz, 6 
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The American economy has become highly antisocial and degraded in the same time 
period that finance has succeeded and expanded so richly, probably as a systemic 
reaction to declining productivity and profit rates. Much of the wealth generated from 
the capital accumulation process is increasingly siphoned off by a small minority of the 
population. This creates a situation where the majority experience a socioeconomic 
decline while a small fraction of the population register unprecedented gains in terms of 
the accumulation of capital and the evaluation of assets. 
91
 
This graph by Tcherneva (2017) indicates the gradual ‘over time’ process by which the 
top 10% of income-earners have been capturing larger portions of national income. The 
process has been ongoing since the 1950s, but its most extreme severity corresponds to 
the post-70’s shift to financialization. The distribution of wealth as derived from the 
capital-accumulation process has reached a point of extreme stratification: 







It is notable from this graph that the top 20%  of Americans are the only quintile with a 
wealth share in excess of income share. This is undoubtedly related to the many rising 
contract-costs and asset-inflations levied on the American population. Within such a 
structure of obligatory extraction via financial contracts, the meager income shares 
(cash flows) of the bottom 80% are increasingly funneled into payments to lenders, 
insurance, real estate, utilities, and financial servicing entities.  
Furthermore, the declining trends in investment have led to a widespread 
degradation of infrastructure: roads, drinking water, waste management, bridges, 
schools, energy networks, and transportation have all been in a continual period of 
decline, even as the financial system whose developement circuits might otherwise 
invest in such capital assets have expanded in size and scope.  








Therefore investments have shrunk away from infrastructure, fixed capital, and income 
growth. The economy cannot be said to be working on behalf of the majority population. 
Here is a discussion of the consequences of financialization, citing Zwan’s survey: 
One of the important consequences of the recent developments is ‘that financial 
gains are not reinvested in the firm’s productive facilities but distributed to 
shareholders through dividend payouts and share buybacks’ (Zwan 2014: 107). 
The owners and directors do not have the long-term interest and stability of their 
firm in mind but mainly the value of their shares. The question that the author 
poses is similar to the one that occupied Hilferding some hundred years ago: Are 
we witnessing the victory of the rentier? (Zwan 2014: 105).​94 
 
Lazonick provides a highly detailed analysis of the shift in American ‘business models’; 
the newer model representing business in the age of financialization, in terms of both 
the timescale and the operational principles: 
93 Mazzucato and Wray, 4. America’s infrastructure had continued its trend of degradation 6 years into the 
recovery from the debt-deflation crisis of 2008  




The ‘old-economy model’ described by Lazonick is the economic model many people 
may still conceptualize as being ‘the way business is done’, and certainly is more widely 
viewed as a stable and healthy paradigm. The contemporary shift is, in most ways, a 
major downgrade. The new-economy model involves a shift away from long-termism, 
relationship-based finance, labor empowerment, and internal reinvestment. These 
institutions, despite instilling stability into the economy, simply do not register 
short-term gains to the same degree that financialized operations can.  
We can see that these organizational developments correspond to a few 
intertemporal trends: (1) a detachment of financial assets from fixed capital, (2) a 
continual expansion of private indebtedness​95​, (3) a large and continuing transfer of 
wealth away from the majority of the population and into the hands of a small group of 
95 ​Data in ​section 2.2 
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wealthy capital-controllers and (4) a general trend of increasing instability, 
short-termism, complexity, and burdens levied on the population.  
We should therefore use the rentier model to analyze finance as it operates in 
American capitalism, for two reasons: firstly there is the theoretical aspect; the process 
by which bank credit is a legal tool which establishes contracts of obligatory cash flows 
into the future. Secondly there is a growing urgency to be critical of the real system; the 
empirical and analytical evidence suggesting an increasingly unhealthy and extractive 
system-pattern of American finance. 
 The behavior of finance is inextricable from the functioning and welfare of the 
whole socioeconomic system. This is because the  financial system of a capitalist 
economy is as an ​explanation for the general economic structure​ of accumulation: 
A capitalist economy can be described by a set of interrelated balance sheets and 
income statements.  
 
The liabilities of the balance sheet are commitments to make payments either on 
demand, when a contingency occurs or at specified dates.  
 
Assets on a balance sheet are either financial or real and they yield receipts either 
as the contract is fulfilled, as some underlying productive process generates 
incomes, or as they are sold or pledged.​96 
 
Now, we are in a state of multipronged crisis, a situation inflamed by the COVID19 
pandemic but long-simmering in its financial dimensions. The urgency of critical 
assessment is dialed up with each passing year, as problems go unsolved and in fact 
entrench themselves institutionally: 
As the time of writing (May–June 2020), we are witnessing, simultaneously, a 
health crisis, an economic crisis, and (in most countries) a state capacity crisis. 
Last but not least, a crisis of global governance as well.​97 
 
Therefore, the developement of a ‘financialized’ system of accumulation, displayed in 
firm balance sheets, income distributions, infrastructure degradations, and operational 
practices, should be analyzed as responsible for the current economic situation, which is 
not good.  
96
 Reconstituting the United States Financial Structure, 12 
97
 Burlamaqui and Filho, 2 
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2.2 Structure of the ‘Bubble Economy’ 
 
We know that the GFC was triggered by a ‘housing bubble’, which is a debt 
‘superstructure’ consisting of inflated assets which derived their value (derivatives) from 
the housing-debt of homeowners (mortgage-backed securities). This bubble was created 
through a debt-issuance pattern of expansionary, innovative, profit-seeking behavior. 
Consider that housing prices have been inflating since the 1960’s, interrupted only by 
the 2007-8 crisis but rebounding shortly after: 
 
98 
Hudson (2010) explains that the financialization process has transited the economy 
from an accumulation regime of industrial capital to a ‘financialized bubble’ oriented 
around the ​inflation of capital and asset prices​ as the primary dynamic of capital 
accumulation.  
A Bubble Economy is based on debt leveraging in search of “capital” gains. In as 
much as real estate is the economy’s largest sector and land its largest 
component, these gains are headed by rising site value. The annual rise in land 
prices has far outstripped growth in national income since the late 1960s, 
becoming the driving force in today’s financialized mode of “wealth creation.”​99 
 
98 US Census Bureau; ‘New Sale Residential Index’ 
99 Hudson (2010), pg. 4 
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The problem with such bubbles is that once underway, asset-price inflation 
becomes the only way to sustain the debt burden… The problem is that carrying 
charges on this debt divert income away from being spent on consumption and 
investment.”​100 
 
We can see this accumulation process illustrated in the increasing costs and concurrent 
financial obligations associated with (1) the real-estate market which Americans must 
participate in if they hope to attain a permanent accessing to housing, (2) the 
educational certificates increasingly necessary to participate in the job market, and (3) 
inordinately expensive healthcare services and medications. 
Prospective buyers must devote more and more of their working life to pay off the 
debts needed to buy a home, automobile, education or health care. That is the 
essence of debt deflation.​101  
 
We can note that private indebtedness has been increasing continually over time, for the 
past 70 years: 
Since the 1950s, total private debt as a percentage of GDP has grown consistently: 
It ​passed 100 percent in the early 1980s​; accelerated leading up to the financial 
crisis that started in 2007, when it peaked at over 170 percent; and then 
decreased to just below 150 percent by 2019.​102  
 
Private Loans and Debt Securities, Nonfinancial Sectors, 2019:Q1​103 
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 Percent (%) of GDP Billions of $ 
Businesses 74 15,588 
Households 74 15,612 
- Home Mortgages  49 10,356 
- Consumer Credit 19 4,000 
- Other 6 1,257 
Total  148 31,200 
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Consider that a liability structure is a system based on the relationships between 
creditors and their debtors. These relationships extend into the future and posses a 
fluctuating degree of stability, that stability being a function of the capacity of the 
debtors to repay their obligations.  
GDP being a metric of investment-output, we can infer a relationship in which 
private debt levels exceeding GDP - as began in the 1980’s, and continuing ever since - 
might represent a form of aggregated ponzi finance, in the sense that gross 
investment-output sales are of a smaller quantity than the net payment obligations 
levied onto the private sector by financial contracts.  










This debt-structure expansion corresponds to a long-term inflation of equity markets 
and increases in GDP, meaning more sales, more consumption, more purchases, and 
therefore more accumulation as registered in inflating equity prices. These private debts 
are financial contracts in which credit is provided to the real economy in exchange for 
claims on future income streams.  
 The process is destabilizing because its dynamics induce unhealthy liability 
structures: 
the investments put into place during an investment boom are often of low value 
relative to their costs. As a result liability structures cannot be serviced by the 
cash flows these investments can generate as capital assets and collapse of the 
price level of assets is likely to ensue. A sharp break in the price level of assets 
leads to institutional failures as well as a collapse in the aggregate volume of 
investment. Speculation, the activities Keynes identified with Wall Street, makes 
business cycles, including the sporadic deep depression cycles… the normal result 
of the economic process​104 
 
The engine of this system is bank credit: 
Banks appeared to have created a postindustrial mode of wealth creation by 
issuing enough credit to keep bidding up property prices – and to keep the boom 
going by lending yet more against collateral rising in value.​105 
104 Reconstituting the United States’ Financial Structure, 10-11 




Bezemer and Hudson explain the connection between this system of wealth creation - 
now the general accumulation regime - and the evolution of financialization: 
it was precisely [the] period from the mid-1980s to 2007 that saw the fastest and 
most corrosive inflation in real estate, stocks, and bonds since World War II. 
Nearly all this asset-price inflation was debt-leveraged. Money and credit were 
not spent on tangible capital investment to produce goods and non-financial 
services, and did not raise wage levels ​106 
 





As credit shifted away from the expansion of incomes and investments, it was instead 
funnelled into mortgages: 
106 Bezemer and Hudson, 746 





In this figure, we can see the process since the 1990’s in which credit stocks as a 
percentage (%) of GDP has increasingly been funneled into real-estate, exhibiting a 
‘bias’ to the detriment of productive enterprise. 
Palley (2008) provides a good summary of how this system of accumulation 
instrumentalizes bank credit to inflate asset-prices: 
Asset prices are bid up by a host of measures, including higher profits, savings by 
the super-rich that are directed to asset purchases, borrowing to buy assets, and 
such institutional changes as the shift from traditional defined benefit pension 
plans to defined contribution—such as 401(k)—pension plans. Consumption is 
maintained by lower household savings rates and by borrowing that is 
collateralized by higher asset prices.​109 
 
It is in the interest of financial institutions, who seek continual profits from the 
accelerating success of their financial operations, that overall levels of indebtedness 
increase. This is not true in the aggregated long term, as Minsky explains, but in the 
short term each new ‘paper’ is a new source of profit, even multiplying profit, if new 
financial assets can be alchemically engineered from the initial anchor of the 
debt-contract. This why long-term, responsible finance has become increasingly 
108
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109
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untenable: it is bad for daily business, even if it is necessary for aggregated structural 
integrity. Minsky in the late 1980’s explained the structural process by which the 
financial sector can ‘feed itself’ from inputs of financial contracts as established by 
banks: 
 The developement of the money market funds, the continued growth of mutual 
and pension funds and the emergence of the vast institutional holdings by 
offshore entities provide a market for the instruments created by securitization​110 
 
Thus the structure of the economy is inflationary to the benefit of financial institutions 
and those with meaningful asset ownership, and negatively impactful for the rest of the 
population. The continual issuance of financial contracts as claims on future income 
streams has concurred with a long-term economic stagnation in terms of income flows 
to the majority population, gradually increasing the payment obligations levied on the 
American population without much developement in exchange. Stories like this one are 
common: 
The home health aide in Penfield, N.Y., has spent the past several months 
stretching the $12.89 an hour she earns to cover her mortgage and utilities. 
 
Now with barely 25 hours of work a week and bills piling up, Barber, 60, worries 
the federal government will resume withholding 12 percent of her paycheck for a 
past-due student loan.​111 
 
We see in this example a multi-pronged extraction apparatus levied against a woman 
making $13 an hour. She is financially obliged to pay the bank, the utility companies, 
and the student-loan issuer, all out a wholly inadequate cash flow. This is one story 
among many, in a broader situation commonly identified as a student loan ‘crisis’: 
Some 44 million Americans collectively hold over $1.6 trillion in student debt. 
And these numbers are growing.  
 
College is more expensive — and important — than ever before. And that 
dichotomy puts students in a difficult situation: do they risk going into debt they 
can’t pay back or miss out on the benefits of a college degree? 
 
During the 2008 recession, many opted to go back to school and gain new skills. 
However, since then, the cost of a four-year college degree increased by 25% and 
110  Minsky, “Securitization”, 3 
111
 Washington Post, Looming end to student loan payment moratorium raises fears among defaulted 
borrowers (my emphasis) 
 
57 
student debt increased by 107% and many are less sure if college will be the 
solution to riding out a recession this time around. 
 
Today, ​more than 30% of student loan borrowers are in default, late or have 
stopped making payments​ six years after graduation.​112 
 
Student loans are only a fraction of the liability structure: mortgages are the biggest 
chunk. Health insurance, which is a unique cost levied only on Americans among those 
citizens of the wealthy capitalist nations, subordinates healthcare services to an 
obligatory payment system. This is in addition to taxes, auto loans, and any credit lines 
which might necessary for business enterprise.  
The rentier system is extra cruel because it subjects those with decreasing 
abilities to pay to increasingly harsh obligations. Besides being punitive and regressive, 
this system increases the posturing through which the general liability structure 
occupies a ‘ponzi’ position.​113​ Albo (2001) argues that the effect on the American 
working-class is quite negative: 
the unemployment figures conceal as much as they reveal: the growth of 
involuntary part-time work, underemployment, and contingent work all serve to 
increase labor reserve pressures impacting on labor effort and the rate of 
exploitation. Amazingly the new economy has spelled the end of the forty-hour 
week. Americans now work longer hours daily, weekly, and yearly, than workers 
in any of the other advanced capitalist states.​114 
 
The result is an economy in which capital assets are inflating while the wages, 
infrastructure, and tangible investments are declining. A new kind of stagflation: 
Health care now absorbs 18 percent of the GDP. If you look at the other costs, if 
you’re a wage earner, 15 percent of your income right off the bat goes to Social 
Security and medical insurance. You have regular taxes, anywhere from about 20 
percent. You have mortgage debt that is up to about 40-43 percent of average 
income. At least that’s what the U.S government is willing to guarantee when 
112 CNBC, ​https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/12/how-student-debt-became-a-1point6-trillion-crisis.html​ (my 
emphasis) 
113
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bankers make a loan. You have other loans; you have student debt to pay for an 
education in order to get a job, you have automobile debt to get to the job.​115 
 
Recall that a financial structure which demands more payments than the productive 
sphere or households can generate can only grow through a debt-bubble: the issuance of 
new debts to continually prevent a debt-deflation on previously-issued obligations. 
the “organization of investment markets” determines whether speculation or 
enterprise is dominant in an economy. In Keynes theory it is important that 
financial markets be structured so that the financing of enterprise dominates.​116 
 
Following Minsky’s structural claim regarding the speculative/enterprising dichotomy 
of capitalism, we can cite Gronow (2020) for a description of the contemporary 
‘organization of investment markets’. We can argue that speculation in the extreme is 
the dominant posture:  
In the capital markets, large institutional investors such as pension funds needed 
new investment targets and were able to diversify their portfolios by buying 
bonds based on securitized assets of various kinds. By facilitating securitization, 
banks were able to serve their clients while at the same time circumventing 
international banking regulations, such as capital adequacy requirements, that 
would otherwise limit the amount of money banks could advance in the form of 
loans. This was further encouraged by the slackening of the distinction that had 
previously separated commercial banks from savings banks​117 
 
The organizational structure of investment markets, being increasingly subordinated to 
the logics and principles of financialization, therefore establishes an economy of 
speculation, grown through the inflation of asset prices, while those large majorities of 
the population without access to capital ownership or premier credit-lines absorb the 
social and economic burdens.  
This evolution of dynamics corresponds to the financialization of the American 
economy: particularly the increasingly ‘internal’ investments of the financial sector and 
the detachment of financial assets and instruments from tangible investments in wages, 
fixed capital, and infrastructure. Here is Hudson’s summary of the situation: 
financialization squeezes out an economic surplus not by employing labor to 
produce commodities for sale at a markup but by getting labor and industry into 
115
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debt. It extracts a financial surplus in the form of interest, not profits on 
production and sales.  
 
finance capitalism uses this surplus to extend yet new interest-bearing loans, not 
to invest in tangible capital formation. When income is insufficient to pay 
bondholders, financial managers extract revenue by carving up and selling off 
assets. Such zero-sum (or even negative-sum) transfer payments do not promote 
growth but polarize the distribution of wealth in ways that dry up the domestic 
market for consumer goods and investment goods. ​118 
 
2.3 Operations within the Bubble Economy 
The operational systems of our financialized economy, in which the inflation of 
asset-prices has superceded fixed-capital investment as the primary process of capital 
accumulation, are extremely complicated, even for those involved​119​. Gronow explains 
the abstraction necessary for the system to be legitimized: 
Because the objects of trade sold and bought in the financial markets are bonds 
or securities... one could imagine that all that is expected from the participants is, 
in addition to having some initial capital at their disposal, that they have 
internalized the abstract logic and dynamics of the self-accumulation of capital.​120 
 
Financialization has, ​by design​, made finance increasingly complicated and 
sophisticated as a longerm industrial-reorganization: 
Goldman Sachs now holds a bank charter, even though Goldman operates more 
like a hedge fund than like a traditional banker… the biggest banks [often] take 
positions that pay off when customers fail. They also originate many assets to sell 
- earning fees rather than relying on interest and principle payments... Further, a 
bigger part of their asset portfolio consists of trading assets - where profits 
depend on asset price appreciation, rather than income flow ​121 
 
On the eve of the 2007 crash, we no longer had any sharp distinction between 
investment banking and commercial banking… there was a handful of behemoth 
financial institutions that provided the four main financial services: commercial 
118 Transition from Industrial Capitalism to a Financialized Bubble Economy, 28 
119
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banking (short-term finance for business and government), payments services… 
investment banking (long-term financing for firms and governments), and 
mortgages​122 
 
Davis (2016) dissects the balance sheets of American corporations to explore this 
growing complexity: 
“The category of  “other” financial assets grows substantially... since the early 
1980’s. Unfortunately, the documentation explaining what is included in “other” 
assets is severely limited… Kripnner (2012, p.55) cites in listing [from business 
press media] “an array of new financial instruments [held on firm balance sheets] 
- money market funds, ‘stripped’ treasuries, Euromarket and Carribean offshore 
dollar markets, foreign currency instruments, and portfolios composed of options 
and futures contracts” as well as “stock market investments… investments in a 
company’s own securities, minority interest in unconsolidated subsidiaries, stock 
issuance costs, and restricted stock.​123 
 
These hard-to-classify assets categorized blankly as ‘others’ have been expanding “at the 
aggregate level… unidentified financial assets constitute the largest component of 
financial asset growth in the flow of funds data”​124​. Thus we have a wide degree of 
ambiguity undergirding the operations of finance, in terms of logics, organization, and 
asset compositions. Yet for all that we do not know, we do know that financial 
operations have become increasingly advanced, accelerated, and technologically 
powerful. Here is a quick history of financialization since the late 1990s: 
the dot-com boom... was soon followed by the real estate boom, followed in turn 
by a commodities boom. All three of these speculative excesses required finance, 
and each was fueled by innovative instruments and practices.  
 
The dotcom boom relied largely on the new-issue market, in which stocks were 
sold for start-up companies with no history on which to base the values of the 
firms. Standards were gradually lowered until firms with no prospective revenues 
but high costs could float equities at astronomical prices. Leveraged buyouts 
allowed management and the owners of upstarts like AOL to cash out as they 
took over profitable, venerable firms like Time Warner.  
 
When that euphoria finally came to an ignoble end, managed money moved into 
real estate. Here, the preferred financial instrument was the securitized mortgage 
product, essential for the “originate and distribute” model that could ignore risk 
while unserviceable debt drove the biggest real estate boom in U.S. history.  
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But securities were not limited to the real estate market—everything from student 
loans to credit card receivables to auto finance was securitized and bought by 
highly leveraged pension funds and hedge funds. Even as that began to unwind, 
managed money moved into commodities, using futures markets to fuel another 
record run-up of prices—this time, prices of food and energy. Analysts are just 
now beginning to turn their focus to those excesses.​125 
 
Financial institutions sift through productive entities; websites, land, housing, and 
commodities, with the general objective engineering new financial instruments and 
assets which can be sold for inflated markups or held in pools for the managed 
accumulation of capital.  
Complexity is not a byproduct of this process but an integral element of the 
accumulation regime; the reason is that complexity engenders the very dynamics by 
which the bubble-economy reproduces itself and generates profits: systemic 
diversification, delineation of services, obfuscation of financial relationships, and the 
manipulation of financial contracts and assets. Consider the practice of shadow banking, 
a major driving force behind financialization and economic instability; even the name 
speaks to dynamic of ‘planned complexity’: 
A major driver in the growth of the shadow banking system has been the 
transformation of the largest banks since the early-1980s from low return on 
equity (RoE) utility banks that originated loans and held them until maturity, to 
high RoE entities that originate loans in order to warehouse and later securitize 
and distribute them.  
 
By leveraging up through securitization, the bank could increase their RoE, 
apparently without risk. The problem was that in the process banks were 
fabricating new assets with dubious quality just for the sake of increasing their 
balance sheets (Adrian and Shin 2009a, p. 12)... 
 
their underwriting capacity was undermined as they relied more and more on 
rating agencies and collateral values in the loan process. funds rose rapidly in the 
1980s, from under $100 billion in 1980 to almost $2 trillion by 2000 (Gorton 
and Metrick 2010, p. 6). By the end of 2008, their size had doubled to almost $4 
trillion! They offer a bank-like product and almost instant access while 
pretending to be as safe as bank deposits.​126 
 
In terms of the ‘operations’ of the bubble economy, there are simply too many 
overcomplicated processes by which financial entities and intermediaries can profit 
125 “Securitization”, pg. 2-3 (Wray’s forward)  
126
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from cash flows, evaluated capital, debt-commodities, engineered assets, and contracts 
of obligation. The important point is that this financialized economy, established as 
being broadly negative and harmful to the real economy, is a ‘planned’ system, not a free 
market but rather a ​highly structured​ organizational apparatus.  
The systems and structures are so complex that they cannot be operationalized 
without a vast network of advanced information technology. Digital networks are 
undoubtedly central to the operations and structures of modern capitalism. Schiller 
(2014) describes how financial institutions latched on to developments in IT for the 
expansion of their profit-seeking programs​127​. An extensive degree of planning and 
inter-institutional cooperation defined these developments. This is what it means for an 
accumulation regime to be a ‘regime’, as opposed to an organically evolving market. 
Consider these accounts: 
Financialization was animated by and reliant on burgeoning network systems: in 
2008 financial services companies constituted the United States’ second-largest 
sectoral source of demand for ICTs... $46.7 billion, or 18.4 percent of all annual 
spending by nonfarm U.S. businesses on information and communications 
technology equipment and software.​128 
 
NASDAQ cooperated with the New York Stock Exchange to establish a jointly 
owned subsidiary—the Securities Industry Automation Corporation, or SIAC—in 
1972. With clearance and settlement responsibilities, SIAC managed a network 
serving 290 member firms, which employed 1.5 million miles of carrier circuits 
supplied by five terrestrial and three satellite carriers. Looking forward from 
1977, SIAC anticipated a bright future for innovation of networked financial 
services.​129 
 
Financial institutions quickly recognized that information technology offered a 
temporary solution to the intertemporal question of capital accumulation: ‘how can we 
make more money faster?’ This is not hyperbole: 
Citigroup announced an agreement to incorporate access to IBM’s 
supercomputer, Watson, “to ​rethink and redesign the various ways in which our 
customers and clients interact with money​.”... “Financial institutions engaged in 
127
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high-velocity trading are speed demons,” explained an analyst: “They claim that 
shaving off just a few milliseconds of connectivity between two trading locations 
can earn them tens of millions of dollars a year—so they’re willing to pay extra for 
the fastest path.”​130 
 
The development of this system can be read in the same way that Marx (1848) described 
the industrial expansion of European capitalism into new territories, new sectors, and 
new industrial focuses like shipping and commerce. He argued that “[capital owners] 
cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and 
thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society​”​131​. 
Consider these systems: 
U.S. Federal Reserve Wire System Clearing House Interbank Payments Systems 
(CHIPS, formed in 1970); the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunications (SWIFT, formed in 1973); and the big credit card networks. 
By the end of the 1970s, tens of billions of dollars traversed these systems each 
day​132 
 
All of this of course was to no benefit but those in an institutional position to benefit 
from a newly-developed manipulation of monetary networks: 
This allowed financial officers to consult the latest information, and then to 
transfer funds instantaneously via Chase’s network to “ensure full utilization of 
money,” as Chase boasted. “Telecommunications,” reported a Chase executive, 
“has entered a period of explosive growth”​133 
 
By 2006, J.P. Morgan boasted an information technology staff of twenty 
thousand and a $7 billion annual IT budget... “[a] clutch of quants with PhDs 
have been hired to create algorithmic models that speed up trading.”​134  
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This expansionism of financial infrastructure and operations begs the question of what 
exactly is being done with all this technology and capacity. Consider the process of a 
private equity firm’s usual operations as an example of what financialization does to the 
productive economy: 
(1) "Private equity firms typically finance the acquisition of an asset with 
investors’ funds that are used as leverage for the accumulation of debt necessary 
to complete the acquisition" 
(2) "Morgan (2009) explains, what occurs is the “capture of the rights to the 
returns on large assets based on a proportionately small equity commitment” 
(230–31)” 
(3) The asset is duly “sweated,” which is to say that it is used as leverage while the 
new owners sell off that which can be profitably sold, engineering further debt 
whose favorable tax treatment yields further returns to the investors 
(4) "Normally, within 10 years, the asset is sold, leaner but not necessarily fitter, 
with many previous claim holders (including pension savers) finding themselves 
significantly poorer, but with little legal recourse"​135 
 
Keaney provides this summarizing conclusion of what the process does to a particular 
productive asset or structure:  
the nominally productive asset, instead of being nurtured and allowed to grow, is 
instead denatured and thereafter left to sink or swim, having served its purpose 
as a vehicle for the financial engineering that enables the profit-making of the 
investors​136 
 
Here is an explanation of the system by “Henry McVey of Morgan Stanley”: 
 
these funds usually plan to own companies for no more than five years and their 
main focus is on maximising cash flow to meet interest payments and to pay 
down debt. Capital expenditure is a hindrance . . . whereas in the past firms 
engaging in leveraged buy-outs actually had to know something about the 
business they were buying into, today they can ​earn huge returns by merely 
getting rid of the excess cash on the balance sheet​.​137 
 
Growow cites Espisoto for an updated account of how contemporary financial markets 
securitize capital assets. Minsky’s skeletal model still remains accurate, although titles 
and scales have evolved. The distinction between ‘paper issuers’ who manufacture 
135 Keaney, 48 
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financial contracts and ‘investment bankers’ who securitize the debts has become more 
complex and delineated as financial markets have innovated and scaled up operations: 
(1) First, the originating bank bundles together a large number of loans, often 
several thousand, even up to tens of thousands, in the form of a pool that is 
transferred to a third party, a legal entity known as a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV). 
 
(2) The SPV then issues an asset-backed security (ABS), or a financial security 
having many of the same properties as a traditional bond. The SPV centrally 
processes the flows from the initial loans (interest and repayment a principal) 
and redirects them to the owners of the ABS 
 
(3) Any type of loan can be securitized in this way: mortgage loans, business 
loans, leveraged-buyout debt, consumer loans, credit-card overdrafts, and so on. 
Once repackaged, such assets are as a rule bought and sold by pension funds, 
insurance companies, and large corporations. They have ceased to be illiquid. 
 
(4) this is only possible with the help of often quite complicated legal 
arrangements and mathematical-statistical instruments of calculation.​138 
 
We should also not forget, as clarified in Minsky’s description of the ‘ladder’ of 
securitization, that all these expansions and accelerations relied upon the growing 
indebtedness of the entire society: 
 “This titanic buildup of networked finance had pushed debt onto every social 
institution and packaged it in a staggering variety of instruments… The “chains of 
potential contagion,” as Hugo Radice put it, “reached to the furthest corners of 
global finance.” Leverage— debt—was the fuel for this fire, and debt was, quite 
literally, everywhere ”​139 
 
We can see that the system is maladaptive; larger volumes of speculative or otherwise 
‘unpayable’ debts force the economic structure into a position of accelerating deviation 
and instability​140​. The argument of this section in particular is that the real behaviors 
and systems of finance indicate an embracing and expansionism of this ‘mode’ of capital 
accumulation; the system of increasing speculation and predation through private 
financial operations.  
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The financial sector focuses its energies into speculation and the expansion of the 
capacity to speculate and extract rents. Financial institutions, if asked to ask to engage 
in healthy, moderated debt-issuances, will be tasked with an objective that is 
fundamentally incompatible with their modus operandi. Financial markets are investors 
markets. Gronow explains the significance of this to the capital accumulation regime:  
Financial markets admittedly differ from the markets of consumer goods in many 
ways as far as their sellers and buyers are concerned. They are investors’ markets, 
where the explicit goal of all the market actors is to make a profit, thus 
accumulating more capital… the meaning of the action of the economic actors in 
these markets is formal rationality under-stood in terms of monetary 
accounting"​141 
 
Keynes in the 1930’s discussed the process by which this kind of economic structure 
directs energy into unstable expansionism: 
“the financial system… might direct its efforts toward creating short-term profits 
generated by rising asset prices (speculation) rather than toward profits 
generated by productive activities that create income flows”​142 
 
We are certainly seeing this occur now; the emphasis of finance is on acceleration and 
expansion, for the general objective of an inflating posture of short-term gain. To the 
degree that structural complexity, technological capacity, and predatory operations 
facilitate this process, we can observe the general pattern of financialization. 
 
2.4 Institutionalizing the Bubble 
 
Hudson argues that the ‘economic distortion’ of financialization has occurred because of 
the ‘planning’ of banking and financial institutions.  For this reason it is politically 
difficult to alter the institutional structure of the economy in a way which would deviate 
from the profit-seeking interests of finance, even if certain changes might dramatically 
improve the quality of life for most Americans.  
This kind of economic distortion is largely the result of relinquishing planning 
and the structuring of markets to large banks and other financial institutions. In 
the name of “free markets” the economics profession has celebrated the shift of 
planning and tax policy to the financial sector, whose lobbyists have rewritten the 
141 Gronow, 127 
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tax code and sponsored deregulation of the checks and balances put in place in 
the Progressive Era a century ago.​143 
 
As Hudson argues, the American government has “become the property bubble’s 
ultimate enabler(s)”​144​. When economies structured around asset-inflations collapse in 
debt-deflations, inevitably, the Big Bank must step in to save them. Although necessary 
for maintaining the integrity of the financial structure, these rescues often appear to 
take the form of handouts: 
Central banks led by the U.S. Federal Reserve reacted [to the GFC] by flooding 
the financial system with liquidity. If they had not done so, in the opinion of 
economist Martin Wolf, “we would surely have suffered a second Great 
Depression.”... as of March 2009, the U.S. central bank had committed $7.7 
trillion to preserving the status quo... 
 
The man charged with overseeing the government’s rescue program declared that 
it “had been designed by Wall Street, for Wall Street . . . an unprecedented trillion 
dollar playground for fraud and self-dealing.”​145 
 
The Fed has succeeded in preventing the collapse of the debt superstructure by 
continually pumping liquidity into the system. Minsky emphasized in the 1990s that 
bailouts were no longer the paramount focus of economic stabilization, but rather the 
prevention of​ ​recurring deflations.​146​ The catastrophe of the 2008 crisis indicated a total 
total failure of the financialized growth model. Had the debt-deflation unfolded 
unabated, it would surely have instigated a depression and a downfall of the financial 
sector in its current organization. The Federal Reserve intervened to prevent this: 
143 ​Hudson (2010), 33 
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simply to give liquidity to mortgages (which traditionally were held by the banks that originated them), 
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145
 Schiller, 53 
146
 Minsky, “Reconstituting the United States’ Financial Structure: Some Fundamental Issues”, pg. 7: In a 
particular Keynesian view the 1990-1991 crisis of the Savings and Loans and the banking system is the 
result of a tendency, over protracted periods of good times, for indebtedness and asset prices to outrun 
the ability of cash flows to validate debt contracts and asset prices. The current problem is not how to bail 




Each time a financial innovation was tested by a crisis, the Fed and other major 
central banks intervened to validate it... in the US, the government (whether the 
Treasury or one of many governmental agencies) stands behind one-third of all 
privately issued liabilities​147 
 
This system being ‘institutionalized’ means that it exists beyond a state of market 
organization; the previous section discusses the extensive planning within the private 
sector of finance. We can also see that  the financial sector is connected heavily to 
representative government: 
The banks that contributed so much to causing the crisis are largely intact, and 
banking insiders have steered US economic policy with great continuity over the 
terms of the Clinton, second Bush, and Obama administrations. Bush’s Treasury 
Secretary,  Hank Paulson, a former Goldman Sachs chief executive, was replaced 
by Timothy Geithner, who, as chief executive of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, coordinated the Targeted Asset Relief Program with Paulson, and who, as 
Treasury Secretary, did everything in his power to prevent radical overhaul of the 
banks, possibly even to the point of insubordination (Suskind 2011, 378).  
 
Geithner’s eventual replacement as Treasury Secretary in 2013 was Jack Lew, a 
veteran of Citigroup who was already, prior to Obama’s taking office, the 
preferred candidate for chairman of the National Economic Council but 
vulnerable to congressional scrutiny, given his rewards amid catastrophic failure 
(Suskind 2011,  147–48)”​148 
 
This is often referred to as ‘regulatory capture’, in reference to the penetration of 
financial operatives into major positions of public-sector power. We can observe that 
this phenomenon is in fact the norm in American democracy.  
The banking system is managed top-down by the Federal Reserve, the 
semi-independent Central Bank of the United States. Hudson describes the historical 
relation between the Federal Reserve and private banking, the point being that this 
history explains the current functioning of the Fed: 
the leading bankers sought to use the [1907] crisis as an opportunity to grab 
power for Wall Street, away from the Treasury. In this sense, the Fed was 
founded in large part to take monetary control away from Washington’s elected 
officials and appointees, and privatize the supply of money and credit.  
147 Mazzucato and Wray, 23-24 




its place in the U.S. financial and economic structure is to allocate credit, 
primarily to serve Wall Street financial interests. That explains the insistence on 
the financial class here and abroad in insisting on an “independent” central bank. 
It means that instead of serving the public interest, it serves the interests of the 
banking class.​149 
 
As for the judicial apparatus - the courts and lawyers who shape the daily composition of 
American law, Pistor (2019), in her book ​Code of Capital​, explains in great detail the 
process by which modern American legal firms manipulate the economy to legitimize 
and engineer financial assets, essentially ‘writing the rules’ of modern capital 
accumulation as defined by abstracted financial instruments, to the benefit of 
capital-controllers and the financial sector.  
All of this is to briefly describe an institutional structure which makes systemic 
reform, or even a ‘creative destruction’, impossible. The representative government 
aligns the rules and administrations in favor of private finance. The Central Bank, 
institutionally separated from the representative government, functions now as a 
continual refinancing mechanism for private finance​150​, acting as the ‘lender of last 
resort’ to a capital-asset inflation economy.  
the Federal Reserve’s low-interest-rate policy succeeded in jump-starting the 
economy by spurring a housing price boom, which in turn sparked a construction 
boom. That boom became a bubble, which burst in the summer of 2007. What is 
important about this history is that the economy needed an asset price bubble to 
restore full employment, just as it had needed the stock market and dot.com 
bubbles to restore full employment in the 1990s.​151 
 
The Federal Reserve is not doing this out of malice or incompetence. In fact as an 
institution it understands, politically and operationally, that an attempt to rein in 
investment levels by withholding liquidity access will be responsible for asset-price 
collapses and output declines.  
149
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The Federal Reserve is now being blamed by many for the bubble, but the reality 
is that it felt compelled to lower interest rates for fear of the economy falling back 
into recession.​152  
 
Palley (2020) argues that the Federal Reserve is subordinated to the political interests of 
the owners and controllers of capital. The primary interest of these entities within a 
‘bubble economy’ is the continued inflation of capital assets which are expected to 
generate significant profits or income flows. 
If this is true  - and its basic supposition of a power dynamic subordinating 
politics to capitalism aligns with the institutional structure laid out thus far - it explains 
the commitment of the Fed to low interest rates. Minsky explained that interest rates 
correspond negatively to the market value of capital assets: 
In a capitalist economy capital assets exist which are expected to yield services to 
production for some time in the future. ​The market value of such capital assets 
can [be] raised if Federal Reserve moves lower long term interest rate​s. However 
unless business profit flows are sustained mere monetary policy is ineffective. 
The likelihood for a further decline in expected nominal value of profit flows 
cannot be ruled out given the extent of excess capacity: this is particularly true of 
commercial real estate.​153 
 
This point by Minsky echos the current situation, in that business profit flows appear 
unable to ‘keep up’ with the rising value of capital assets. Monetary policy has shown 
itself to be incapable of influencing functional development; the fiscal policy which 
might achieve such improvements largely flounders at the congressional level.  
We will conclude this section with a brief acknowledgment of the ‘financial 
literacy’ concept, which is far more insidious than it sounds. It is particularly relevant 
because it indicates the narrative that is being pushed on the general population to 
‘explain’ why so many people struggle to pay their bills, are buried in debts, and lack 
economic opportunities: 
The Council for Economic Education describes itself as “Investing in Our 
Children’s Future: Incorporating personal finance and economic education in our 
nation’s schools.”​154​. The argument put forth is that children must be educated from an 
early age in the doctrines of neoclassical economics (not mentioned but clearly the 
152 ​Palley (2009), 27 
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paradigm) and individual finance. The reasoning is that this educational process will, on 
an ​individual​ level, address and alleviate the negative situations we have described thus 
far in the paper.  
 The CEE has an ‘economic literacy quiz’ on their website​155​, which advertises the 
lessons they teach to children across America. Question 13 explains that “The stock 
market is an example of an institution within our economy that exists to help people 
achieve their economic goals.” I answered question 14 incorrectly: 
156
 
The correct answer on the website is “both the person renting the apartment and the 
landlord”. Why do children need to know this? It is not clear. Perhaps it is important, 
from a young age, that America’s young conceptualize the relationship between financial 
obligee and obliger as mutually beneficial. The following organizations form a ‘partial 










The Council of Economic Education, despite their proliferation throughout American 
schools and after-school programs, is only one institution within a broader cultural 
matrix of FIRE-sector propaganda. The concepts expressed on the website - and the 
donor list - should make this clear.  
This cultural matrix itself is a pillar within the broader structure of 
financialization, which also enjoys support from the government, the central bank, 
economics departments, media outlets, and everyday citizens.  
Financial literacy is a relatively new concept, and undoubtedly a pillar of the 
financialization process as explained by Zwan​158​; the evolution of such a concept - now 
being pushed onto children across America - forms yet another link in the chain of 
financialized capitalism’s vast and complex institutional support-structure. The benefit 
of indoctrinating children to the market-logic of neoclassical economics is obvious 
enough; what is less clear is how helpful ones ‘financial literacy’ even is: 
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath of austerity, financial 
literacy education has been widely propounded around the world as a remedy for 
rising personal debt levels (Arthur 2012, 2014; Alsemgeest 2015; Xu and Zia 
2012). Yet the enthusiasm for such education, which usually takes the form of 
workshops, pamphlets and other materials, and school curricula, is misplaced. 
There is inconclusive evidence to suggest that financial literacy education actually 
produces significant and consistent economic results in people’s lives (see 
Alsemgeest 2015; Bruhn, Ibarra, and McKenzie 2013; Willis 2008, 2011). More 
broadly, financial literacy education tends to reinforce and reify conventional, 
neoliberal approaches, attitudes, and ideologies toward debt, credit, finance, and 
money (Arthur 2012; Martin 2002, 2015). Generally speaking, ​most such 
materials and approaches posit debt and financial hardship as individual 
responsibilities that can be overcome by education, planning, and perseverance​. 
In this sense, they fundamentally obscure the systemic, structural, and social 
factors that shape personal financial experiences under neoliberal global 
capitalism​159 
 
Therefore the argument - which seeks to bind together all aforementioned aspects of the 
‘institutionalized’ bubble economy - is that this economic structure is not a ‘free market’. 
It is a highly planned, centrally administered, and diversified apparatus which behaves 
158





in a domineering fashion throughout American society. The emphasis at any given point 
is always on ensuring the success, proliferation, and expansion of private financial 
operations, for the purpose of accumulation and financial-sector profit.​ This situation 
must be analyzed as a crisis, and a deeply corrupted one at that, for the simple reason 
that the destructive nature of private finance in America, which has wrought so much 
measurable harm to the population, appears incapable of being righted or adjusted. 
In the previous crisis, in the US… both processes (crisis and recovery) had their 
epicenter in finance and were led by financial institutions. The financial 
restructuring process had a big role for central banks but also had ample room 
for their hand-picked private “financial dealers.” J. P. Morgan and Bank of 
America provide the best example for the US.​160 
 
For this reason, the paper concludes with a rejection of the possibility of reforming 
private finance as it relates to capitalist accumulation. The argument is that there is only 
one overarching solution: the severing the capital developement process from the 






2.5 Summary of Chapter 2:  
The contemporary system of capitalism in America can be described as a financialized 
‘bubble economy’ which involves historical, structural, and institutional aspects.  The 
general process has involved an abandonment of the Fordist growth regime and its 
‘managerial’ (regulationist) support structure, in favor of an economy in which the 
inflation of capital and financial assets is the primary mode of accumulation. We can 
identify these core aspects of the financialized economy: 
160 Burlamaqui and Filho, 17 
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(1) Debt-issuance is the primary ‘anchoring’ of value, meaning that committed cash 
flows from investment financing (contracts of obligation) are the primary 
resource to be engineered and managed for the purposes of inflating asset prices 
(2) Vastly overcomplicated operations multiply the sectoral diversity and servicing 
aspects of the financial system, thereby employing an excess volume of analysts, 
activites, and opportunities to realize new profits, fees, or asset engineering .  
(3) The system is deeply ‘planned’ and operationalized through advanced technology 
and inter-organizational cohesion. The degree of intentional structuring 
invalidates the concept that finance is a ‘free market’, and instead indicates that it 
is administratively planned - albeit privately controlled.  
(4) A major institutional apparatus comprised of the representative government, the 
Federal Reserve, the legal system, and a cultural propaganda-scheme 












The paper has described two processes involving capital accumulation. The first is the 
general system of investment financing through which capitalist societies develop 
resources and accrue profits.  The second is the recent evolution of financialization, in 
which private financial operations and systems have commandeered the general 
economy to their own benefit, and largely to the detriment of society.  
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We can conclude therefore that ‘capital accumulation’, being the process by 
which capitalism distributes its resources and energies based on a stratified control 
structure and a financial system of cash flows, must be structured in such a way that an 
orderly system of accumulation can continue within the very complicated structure of 
modern society. The modern ‘structure’ of this system is defined by financialization and 
a growth model of asset-price inflation, in which rising costs are associated with 
expensive capital assets and growing portfolios held by financial institutions and ‘money 
managers’.  
This system is predicated upon an economy of obligation, which is enforced by 
legal contracts related to debts, insurance, real-estate, and financial exchanges. In this 
sense the fundamental dynamic addressed in chapter 1 - the exchange of ‘present 
money’ for ‘future money’ which initiates liability relationships and accompanies the 
development of capital, is still the core system undergirding contemporary capitalism. 
The financialization process is defined as an extra-extractive, malformed outgrowth of 
this process, in the sense that financial institutions have increasingly exploited this 
obligatory payment dynamic for penetrative operations into the real economy.  
To the extent that obligatory payment schemes are driving the accumulation 
process we can observe an increasing instability and degradation of American society, a 
situation in which the majority population has experienced repeated financial crises, a 
long term socioeconomic stagnation, a retreat of government away from public services, 
widespread political discontent, the weakening of labor power, an unaddressed 
ecological crisis based on the current structure of productive capital, a disturbing and 
expanding ‘police state’, a deadly pandemic impacting America worse than any nation 
on earth, and growing burdens associated with mortgage debts, property rents, health 
insurance, automobile debts, student loan debts, utility contracts, and a psychological 
pressure to be personally responsible for one’s increasingly fragile and immoble 
financial situation.  
Not to be negative, but the situation is not good. There are numerous solutions 
which might address and alleviate some of these problems: restructuring the 
oligopolistic tax codes, breaking up structures of corporate consolidation, guaranteeing 
public employment through a Federal program, empowering labor elements, targeting 
regulatory capture and corruption, criminalizing legal forms of corruption such as 
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lobbying and campaign contributions, reorienting government expenditures away from 
excess militarism in favor of social services, making healthcare a public service, 
large-scale debt cancellations, reducing inflation in regard to medications, hospital 
services, real estate, and education, ‘democratizing’ money, investing in infrastructure, 
investing in public transportation, socializing investment via public and community 
banking, degrowth targeting industrial overproduction, replacing fossil fuels with green 
energy, workplace democracy, etc. etc.  
There is no shortage of solutions to address the problems of our society. What is 
truly in ‘deficit’ is the ​political capacity or will​ to do anything meaningful on behalf of 
the American people. Therefore the ‘question’ or the ‘problem’ of economics today is not 
how to develop resources or how to improve the market society through targeted 
polices; the question rather is how the logical steps which can obviously benefit society 
might be actualized within such a corrupted and mypoic political structure. 
For this reason, the paper concludes with the argument that the system of capital 
accumulation through private finance is unhealthy and exploitative. To the degree that 
investment financing is necessary for the creation of resources in a socioeconomic 
system, this process should be socialized, meaning that its systems and powers should 
be severed from privatized, profit-seeking institutions and instead structured around 
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